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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The right of parents, and of the communities in which they live, to 
educate their children according to their own beliefs is a fundamental one, 
and educational pluralism is an essential aspect of respect that liberal 
democratic states must show to their diverse citizenry.  Accordingly, 
Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) states that: “The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to 
have respect for the liberty of parents . . . to ensure the religious and moral 
education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.”1  
Nevertheless, while respect for parents’ and communities’ decisions with 
regard to the form and content of their children’s education should be the 
rule, there are instances in which the liberal democratic state is allowed and 
indeed required to assert its authority in educational matters in order to 
protect the rights and interests of others as well as the public’s interests. 
The Israeli education system is a pluralist system that caters to the diverse 
communities existing in Israeli society.  This is especially true with respect 
to the large Jewish religious communities, which—in addition to a public 
religious education system—enjoy private education systems, the largest of 
which is the ultra-Orthodox (UO) education system.  The UO system, despite 
being private, is heavily funded by the state.  In recent years the Israeli 
Supreme Court has heard two important cases involving the UO education 
system, which have brought to the fore the conflict between religious 
educational autonomy and the authority of the liberal democratic state.  
These cases (the Core Curriculum cases) have highlighted the worrying fact 
that the UO educational system for boys does not teach the core curriculum, 
which includes, in addition to basic subjects such as math and English, 
lessons in citizenship and core democratic values such as tolerance and 
equality.2 
UO schools for boys have for years restricted their curriculum strictly to 
religious studies, because according to UO ideology the study of the Torah is 
                                                                                                                   
 1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 2 HCL 4805/07 The Ctr. for Jewish Pluralism – The Movement for Progressive Judaism in 
Isr. v. Ministry of Educ. et al. (unreported), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/ 
07/050/048/r28/07048050.r28.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2015 (unpublished)). 
2014]    THE UO COMMUNITY IN ISRAEL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 745 
 
 
every man’s highest obligation and is the equivalent of all other religious 
commandments.3   
A few days before the Court was scheduled to rule that the state may not 
continue to fund UO private schools that do not teach the core curriculum, 
the Israeli parliament passed a law that circumvented the Court’s expected 
ruling—the Unique Cultural Educational Institutions Act (the Act).4  The Act 
grants UO high schools (Yeshivot Ketanot) 60% of the funding awarded to 
public schools, regardless of whether they teach any part of the core 
curriculum.5  Although the Act applies only to high schools, the de facto 
situation is that UO schools for boys have for years been teaching almost 
exclusively religious studies at all levels of schooling while still receiving 
extensive state funding.6  Thus, the model of autonomy for UO education 
which the Act establishes, and which has existed de facto even prior to the 
act, is one which combines generous state funding with an almost complete 
lack of state supervision over the content of education.  
In Part II of this Article I will describe the UO community, its educational 
system, the Supreme Court core curriculum cases, and their end result—the 
enactment of the Act.  The proponents of the Act claimed that allowing this 
form of autonomy in education to the UO is required normatively, from the 
perspective of liberal multicultural theory, and is appropriate in a democratic 
society.  In Part III of this Article I will first examine the views of five liberal 
thinkers with regard to the contours of the autonomy that should be granted 
to religious education.  These thinkers disagree on the extent to which the 
state should allow the existence of private religious education, the extent to 
which it should finance such education, and the extent to which it should 
intervene in private religious education in order to ensure that these schools 
maintain an adequate level of civic education.  This disagreement roughly 
matches the distinction between the autonomy-based conception of 
liberalism and the diversity-based conception of liberalism.7 
I will then perform a comparative legal analysis of the autonomy granted 
to religious communities in the area of education in five countries.  I will 
discuss the education of Muslims in the Netherlands and Britain, private 
                                                                                                                   
 3 See Ehud (Udi) Spiegel, Talmud Torah is Equivalent to All: The Ultra-Orthodox 
(Haredi) Education System for Boys in Jerusalem, at vi (The Jerusalem Institute for Israel 
Studies, Series No. 405, 2011).  
 4 The Unique Cultural Educational Institutions Act, 5769-2008, § 1 (Isr.). 
 5 Id. 
 6 See Spiegel, supra note 3, at xvi. 
 7 See generally William Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, 105 ETHICS 516 (1995). 
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religious education in the United States, the Imam Hattip religious schools in 
Turkey, and private Muslim education in Malaysia.  The first three countries 
I discuss—The United States, the Netherlands and Britain—are liberal 
democracies, while the last two—Turkey and Malaysia—are not liberal 
countries.  In both Malaysia and Turkey the majority Muslim religion plays a 
crucial role in shaping the national ethos and the relations between the state 
and religion are much closer than they are in liberal democracies.8  Although 
Israel is customarily considered a liberal democracy and is compared to 
western liberal democracies, its state structure contains some significantly 
illiberal elements, such as the establishment of the Orthodox Jewish religion 
in the state.  Consequently, as I will show, important insights can be gained 
from comparing Israel to countries in which the state is similarly closely 
intertwined with religion.  
I will claim that in liberal countries, as well as in the writings of liberal 
theorists, it is possible to identify two models of autonomy in religious 
education.  One model—which can be found in countries such as Britain and 
the Netherlands—combines a relatively high degree of supervision over the 
content of education with the grant of state funding, and the second model—
which can be found in the United States—combines almost no state funding 
with rather lax supervision.  A third model can be observed in non-liberal 
Malaysia and Turkey.  Because religion and the state are closely intertwined 
in this third, non-liberal model where the state uses religion as a source of 
legitimacy and authority, the autonomy granted to private religious 
educational institutions is highly restricted.  The theoretical and legal 
analysis will lead me to conclude that the form of educational autonomy 
granted to the UO is neither required normatively nor comparable to the 
autonomy granted to the educational systems of religious groups in the 
countries discussed.  Israel, which does not fit any of the above-mentioned 
models, emerges as a unique hybrid that, on the one hand, gives extensive 
religious autonomy in education to the UO community—on misguided 
liberal grounds—while, on the other hand, allowing this same community to 
retain control over the Israeli religious establishment and to enforce its 
increasingly radical religious ideology through this establishment.  Thus, in 
Part IV of the Article I will conduct a detailed analysis of the position of the 
UO community in the Israeli polity, considering, among other things, the 
                                                                                                                   
 8 As we will see infra Part III.B.5, despite the fact that Turkey is an allegedly staunchly 
secular state, the Muslim religion is in fact closely intertwined with the state and highly 
important for the national ethos. 
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unique structure of religion-state relations in Israel and the position of the 
UO within this structure.  I will claim that far from being a disempowered 
enclave community or partial citizens, the UO community in Israel emerges 
as what I will call a prodigious enclave community, which is politically 
strong and highly influential. 
I will claim further that, because of this status, the multicultural discourse 
used to justify the Act and the accommodations that it offers is misplaced.  
My conclusion in Part V will be that the right to an exclusively religious, 
state-funded education that was granted to the UO community by the Act is 
the result of a political power play—that cannot be justified theoretically or 
comparatively and that constitutes a challenge to the rights of others as well 
as to the already shaky liberal democratic foundations of Israel.  I will 
therefore offer some thoughts as to the measures that Israel could take in 
order to thwart the threat to its democratic structure that the current situation 
poses, and will claim that, among other things, the state should cut funding to 
any school that does not teach the core curriculum.   
II.  UO EDUCATION IN ISRAEL—BACKGROUND 
The UO educational system is the largest private educational system in 
Israel and the one that gets the most generous state funding and the least 
supervision.  Before discussing the Israeli educational system and the recent 
core curriculum cases, which demonstrate the problematic nature of the UO 
educational system, it is important to give a short overview of the UO 
community in Israel. 
A.  The UO Community 
The UO Jewish community in Israel consists of around 800,000 people, 
comprising about 10% of the Israeli population.9  The UO community, 
known in Hebrew as the Haredi community, or the Haredim, gets its name 
from the proverb in Isaiah 66:5 “Hear the word of the Lord, you who tremble 
                                                                                                                   
 9 It is very hard to produce accurate estimates of the size of the ultra-orthodox community, 
and the estimates vary according to the measuring methods used.  See Fridman et al., THE 
ISRAELI CENTRAL BUREAU FOR STATISTICS, Measurement and Estimates of the Population of 
Ultra-orthodox Jews, 4–5, 51, 54 (2011) [Hebrew].  
748 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 42:743 
 
 
(haredim) at His word.”10  The UO are a radical segment within Orthodox 
Judaism, and while there are many subgroups within the UO community they 
all distinguish themselves from other Jews by their dress, attitudes, world 
view and the character of their religious lives.11  The three main subgroups in 
the UO community are the Lithuanians, the Hasidim, and the Sephardi UO, 
but these subgroups are themselves divided into many different sub-
communities.12  According to Samuel Heilman and Menachem Friedman, the 
UO can be considered fundamentalists in that they believe in the 
fundamental truths of their religion, which they assume, are unchanging from 
the time of Abraham, and they look to the past as “the great teacher.”13  
Furthermore, a crucial feature of their existence is “a refusal to endorse or 
legitimate contemporary Western culture” and their entire lives are dedicated 
to “fortifying their own way of traditional Judaism” in opposition to 
modernity.14  Thus, while UO fundamentalism is built on a commitment to 
an idealized past, this past has in fact never existed and is constructed and 
reconstructed by UO sages in opposition to developments in modern culture 
and society.15  The UO community has objected to the establishment of the 
state of Israel and still retains an anti-Zionist ideology to this very day.16  
Furthermore, the UO consider themselves, and are often perceived by others 
as, a secluded enclave community.  Nevertheless, UO representatives have 
served in the Israeli Knesset and been involved in Israeli politics since the 
establishment of the state and their political power, as well as their power in 
Israel’s religious establishment, has grown considerably over the years.17 
The UO community is the fastest growing religious community in Israel.  
The average fertility rate of UO women stands at almost 7.7 children per 
woman, as opposed to 2.6 children per woman for the Jewish population in 
general.18  Only about 37% of UO men work while almost half of UO men 
                                                                                                                   
 10 Samuel Heilman & Menachem Friedman, Religious Fundamentalism and Religious 
Jews: The Case of the Haredim, in FUNDAMENTALISMS OBSERVED 197, 198 (Marty & 
Appleby eds., 1994). 
 11 Id. at 197, 199. 
 12 See Spiegel, supra note 3, at xviii. 
 13 Heilman & Friedman, supra note 10, at 197.  
 14 Id. at 198. 
 15 Id. at 257. 
 16 MENACHEM FRIEDMAN, THE HAREDI (ULTRA-ORTHODOX) SOCIETY – SOURCES, TRENDS 
AND PROCESSES 19–20 (1991). 
 17 Id. at 52–54, 188–91. 
 18 The data is from of 2001.  Hagai Levin, The NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL, The Haredi 
Sector in Israel: Empowerment through Workforce Integration 10 (2009) [Hebrew]. 
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study religious studies in Yeshivot and Kolelim and receive stipends from 
the government in return.19  More than 50% of the UO women work, but 
most of them work only part time, due to their domestic duties.20  Because of 
the combination of very high fertility rates with very low workforce 
participation the UO community is the poorest community in Israel and its 
mode of existence is heavily dependent on state funding and on donations.21  
It should be noted that the UO community at the time of the establishment of 
the state of Israel was quite different, with UO women’s fertility rates being 
similar to those of other Jewish women and with UO men quitting their 
religious studies and finding jobs upon marriage.22  Experts have related the 
radical change in the structure of the community to the combination of 
generous financial support by the state and the changing religious and social 
norms within the community as it continued to grow and to gain a more 
powerful position in Israeli society.23  
The continuous study of Tora (Talmud Tora) has always been a central 
ideal in Jewish tradition and is considered the equivalent of all other 
religious commandments.24  While throughout history this ideal—which is 
practically impracticable due to the need to earn a living—has been fully 
realized only by a few select sages, in contemporary UO society in Israel the 
full realization of this ideal has become the sole goal of the UO education 
system.25  Consequently, the UO education system centers on teaching all 
boys rigorous religious studies throughout their school years with almost no 
secular subjects being taught.26  This paves the way for boys in the UO 
community, after finishing Yeshivot Ketanot (the UO equivalent to high 
school), to continue their full time religious studies in Yeshivot Gdolot (until 
                                                                                                                   
 19 Id. at 13. 
 20 Id. at 14–16. 
 21 Id. at 41–43. 
 22 GERSHOM GORENBERG, THE UNMAKING OF ISRAEL 165–66 (2011). 
 23 Norma Gurovich & Eilat Cohen-Kastro, Ultra Orthodox Jews—Geographic Distribution 
and Demographic Social and Economic Characteristics of the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish 
Population in Israel 1996–-2001 (Central Bureau of Statistics—Demography Sector 53–54, 
Working Paper No. 5, 2004) [Hebrew], available at http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/paperwork/ 
pw_e.html; Eli Berman, Subsidized Sacrifice, State Support of Religion In Israel, 12 (The 
Pinhas Sapir Center for Development Tel Aviv University, Discussion Paper No. 2-99, 
December 1998), available at http://sapir.tau.ac.il/papers/sapir-wp/2-99.pdf.  
 24 Spiegel, supra note 3, at vi. 
 25 Id. at xxiv. 
 26 Id. 
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their marriage) and later in Kolelim.27  As already mentioned, currently 
almost half of UO men devote all their time to religious studies in these 
institutions and their only income is stipends they receive from the state.28          
B.  The Israeli Education System and UO Education 
The Israeli educational system consists of three types of schools—public 
schools, private schools that must go through a process of recognition by the 
state (recognized schools), and private schools that have been exempted from 
the recognition (exempt schools).29  According to Israeli law, in order to 
achieve recognition a school must teach at least 75% of the core curriculum 
as set by the Ministry of Education.  A recognized school that teaches the 
core curriculum is eligible for 75% of the state funding given to public 
schools.30  The two largest networks of UO schools are an exception to this 
rule. These schools are recognized schools, comprise more than half of the 
UO educational system, and receive 100% of the funding that public schools 
receive, despite being private.31  The UO educational system is the largest 
private school system in Israel, and it consists of both recognized and exempt 
schools.  One out of every four students in the Jewish educational system 
attends an UO school.  Although the law stipulates that only recognized 
schools that teach the core curriculum can be funded by the state, both 
recognized and exempt UO schools are funded by the state, even though the 
UO schools for boys do not teach the core curriculum or teach only small 
parts of it.  In order to circumvent the enforcement of the core curriculum in 
UO schools, over the years consecutive Ministers of Education have 
abstained from officially defining the core curriculum, despite the fact that 
the Public Education Act requires them to do so.32  Only after a petition 
against the Ministry of Education was filed to the Supreme Court requesting 
an order requiring the ministry to publish an official core curriculum and 
                                                                                                                   
 27 Yaacov Lupu, Haredi Opposition to Haredi High-School Yeshivas, The Floersheimer 
Institute for Policy Studies, 30 (2007). 
 28 Levin, supra note 18, at 13. 
 29 Mandatory Study Act, 5510-1949, SH No. 26, p. 287. 
 30 State Education (Recognized Institutions) Regulations, 5714-1953 (Isr). 
 31 The Budgetary Principles Law, 5745-1985, 37 LSI 61, § 3(A). 
 32 State Education Act, 5713-1953 7 LSI 113, §§ 11, 34(3); Lotem Peri Hazan, The 
Regulation of Ultra Orthodox Education in Israel – Politics, Law and In Between, in 
REGULATION OF EDUCATION (Yossi Yona ed., 2012), 5 [Hebrew]. 
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enforce it on all schools, was an official core curriculum established for 
elementary schools.33  
C.  The Core Curriculum Cases   
In 2002 a petition was filed with the Supreme Court, asking it to declare 
illegal and discriminatory the Ministry of Education’s practice of funding 
UO schools despite the fact that these schools do not teach any part of the 
core curriculum and provide an exclusively religious education.34  In its 
response to the petition, the Ministry of Education asked the court to grant it 
a period of three years to incorporate the core curriculum in UO schools 
gradually and with cultural sensitivity.35  The court accepted the respondent’s 
request, ruling that requiring the implementation of the core curriculum in 
UO schools, while granting the state three years to accomplish this goal in 
cooperation with the UO community, struck the proper balance between 
respect for the educational autonomy of the UO community, the rights of 
children, and the interests of the state.36  The Court explained that the 
purpose of the core curriculum is to enable students to acquire basic 
knowledge, skills, and values that are essential to allow each student to 
function independently in a pluralistic society, and it is based on shared 
universal humanistic values and on the character of Israel as a Jewish and a 
Democratic state.37  In addition, the core curriculum is intended to give every 
child in Israel the basic skills to create a life for himself and to fulfill his 
right to have an equal opportunity to develop his personality and his self, 
both as a child and as an adult.38  The core curriculum includes the study of 
Judaism, citizenship, geography, Hebrew, English, math, sciences, and 
physical education.39 
When, after three years, petitioners realized that the state and the UO 
educational authorities had done nothing to implement the law and to 
introduce the teaching of the core curriculum in UO boys’ schools, while at 
                                                                                                                   
 33 HCL 2751/99 Paritski v. The Minister of Educ. [2000] (unreported) (Isr.). 
 34 HCJ 10296/02 Secondary School Teachers Organization v. Minister of Education IsrSC 
59(3) 224 [2005] (judgment of J. Levy § 1). 
 35 Id. §§ 2–5. 
 36 Id. § 19. 
 37 HCL 4805/07 The Ctr. for Jewish Pluralism – The Movement for Progressive Judaism in 
Isr. v. Ministry of Educ. et al. (judgment of J. Procaccia § 31). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id.  In Arab schools the core curriculum includes Arabic in addition to Hebrew and Arab 
heritage instead of Judaism. 
752 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 42:743 
 
 
the same time the funding for these schools continued unabated, they 
petitioned the court again requesting another court order against the Ministry.  
This time the Ministry of Education notified the court that it had concluded 
that at the present time it was unwise to enforce the introduction of the core 
curriculum in UO high schools for boys, and asked the court to permit it to 
continue its attempts to reach an agreement with the UO community as to the 
implementation of the core curriculum.40  The ministry acknowledged that 
having tens of thousands of students each year exempted from the teaching 
of the core curriculum jeopardizes important state interests, but opined that 
under the circumstances this was the right thing to do.41 
The court categorically rejected the position of the Ministry of Education, 
viewing the failure to implement the core curriculum in UO boys’ schools as 
a serious violation of the rights of UO school children to education and to 
equal opportunities, and as a threat to important state interests.  While the 
court acknowledged the importance of the autonomy of parents to decide on 
the education of their children, it opined that the importance of a common 
core curriculum is especially high in a country such as Israel where the 
divisions in society are deep and widespread.42  Furthermore, the right of 
parents to autonomy in choosing their children’s education cannot supersede 
the right of the child to have a basic education that supplies him with the 
skills which allow him to fulfill his personality and his capabilities.43  The 
court agreed that deep cultural differences might justify a more gradual 
enforcement of the core curriculum on certain cultural groups, but stressed 
that the need for gradual implementation of equal enforcement cannot be 
used to dispense with equal enforcement altogether as the ministry of 
education was attempting to do in the case at hand.44 
Nevertheless, though the court was set to give an order mandating the 
enforcement of the core curriculum for the coming school year and 
terminating the funding of all schools that refuse to implement it, the Court 
did not do so.45  A few days before the judgment was due to be published, 
and after it was already written, the Knesset passed the Unique Cultural 
                                                                                                                   
 40 Id. §§ 15–16.  
 41 Id. § 17.  The UO educational authorities objected to the suggestion to reduce their 
funding to 55% and insisted that it be kept at 75% and that they be exempt from the duty to 
teach the core curriculum. 
 42 Id. § 58. 
 43 Id. § 55. 
 44 Id. §§ 76–79. 
 45 Id. § 83. 
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Educational Institutions Act (the Act), which exempts UO boys’ high schools 
from the duty to teach the core curriculum, while continuing to grant them 
state funding.46  Because the Act changed the legal situation pertinent to the 
case while court proceedings were still in progress, the court refrained from 
issuing any orders, but published the detailed written opinion it had already 
prepared. 
D.  The Act 
The Act was an initiative of the UO Knesset members aimed at 
circumventing the coming decision of the court and was passed with the 
support of secular Knesset members.47  The explanatory notes for the 
proposed Act stated that the Act’s purpose is to enable the existence of the 
educational institutions of the UO community and similar unique cultural 
communities, in view of the need to respect the rights of such unique cultural 
communities, and to enable them to maintain their own educational 
institutions.48  The Act defines a “unique cultural educational institution” as 
an educational institution, which gives systemic education that originates 
from the way of life of the unique cultural group and is in accordance with 
the unique characteristics of the group.49  The only group to which the act 
explicitly applies is the UO community.50  The Act grants UO high schools 
(Yeshivot Ketanot) 60% of the funding awarded to public schools, regardless 
of whether they teach the core curriculum, thus enabling them not to teach 
their students any basic skills, such as math, English, or citizenship 
education.  Although the Act applies only to high schools, the de facto 
situation is that UO schools for boys have taught almost exclusively religious 
studies at all levels of schooling while still receiving extensive state funding 
for years.51  Thus, the model of autonomy for UO education which the Act 
                                                                                                                   
 46 The Unique Cultural Educational Institutions Act 2008, § 1. 
 47 Tami Harel Ben Shachar, Educational Autonomy, The Core Curriculum, and Public 
Funding of Education — The Special Cultural Educational Institutions Act, 2008, 12 MISHPAT 
U’MIMSHAL 281; see infra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 48 Proposed Act: Unique Cultural Education Institutions, 239 Proposed Acts 350 (June 23, 
2008). 
 49 Id.  The only group to which the Act explicitly applies is the UO community.  The 
Minister of Education has the authority to recognize other groups as unique cultural groups for 
the purpose of the act, but thus far no other group has been recognized as such. 
 50 Id. the Minister of Education has the authority to recognize other groups as unique 
cultural groups for the purposes of the act, but thus far no other group has been recognized as 
such. 
 51 Spiegel, supra note 3.  
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establishes, and which existed in practice prior to the act, is one which 
combines generous state funding with an almost complete lack of state 
supervision over the content of education.  
To conclude, the UO educational system in Israel is a private, religious 
one that is heavily funded by the state but at the same time subject to very 
little state control.  One could argue, as the supporters of the Act have, that 
giving religious parents and communities a free hand to determine the 
education of their children and helping them to fund this education is 
required as a matter of multicultural justice and freedom of religion.  In order 
to evaluate this claim, in the next section I will review the positions of 
different theorists on this issue and describe the way in which five different 
countries deal with the educational systems of religious groups.  
III.  THEORETICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON EDUCATIONAL 
AUTONOMY FOR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES 
A.  Theoretical Perspectives 
Education plays a crucial role in shaping world views and the identities of 
children and of young adults.  As philosopher Elizabeth Minnich argues, 
“education is of critical importance.  It is in and through education that a 
culture, and polity, not only tries to perpetuate but enacts the kinds of 
thinking it welcomes, and discards and/or discredits the kinds it fears.”52  For 
this reason educational autonomy is highly important for religious minorities.  
Nevertheless, for the same reason, partial state control over private education 
seems necessary to ensure that important interests of the liberal democratic 
state are not jeopardized.  
When assessing autonomy in religious education the rights and interests 
of three actors should be taken into account.53  First, the interest of the 
parents, whose right to decide the education of their child is part of their 
religious freedom.54  Most often the parents belong to a religious community 
and aspire to inculcate in the child that community’s religious values and 
                                                                                                                   
 52 ELIZABETH MINNICH, TRANSFORMING KNOWLEDGE 53 (1990). 
 53 ROB REICH, BRIDGING LIBERALISM AND MULTICULTURALISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 
148–49 (2002). 
 54 Galston refers to this right as their right to expressive liberty. See, e.g., WILLIAM 
GALSTON, THE PRACTICE OF LIBERAL PLURALISM 45 (2005). 
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way of life, an interest which they share with the community.55  The second 
actor is the child, whose right to an enabling education and to equal 
opportunities can be jeopardized by her parents’ educational choices for 
her.56  Finally, the third actor is the state; as we will see, many theorists argue 
that the continued existence of the state as a functioning democracy depends 
on its citizens’ ability to participate in the life of a modern democratic state, 
an ability that can only be acquired through education.  
Liberal thinkers disagree on how the balance should be struck between 
these different sets of interests, and consequently about the extent to which 
the state should allow the existence of private religious education, whether it 
should finance such education, and whether it should intervene in private 
religious education in order to ensure that private religious schools maintain 
an adequate level of civic education.  This disagreement roughly matches the 
distinction between the autonomy-based conception of liberalism and the 
diversity-based conception of liberalism.57  In what follows I will describe 
the positions of five theorists.  I will start with Brian Barry, who holds an 
autonomy-based conception of liberalism and who is perhaps the most avid 
supporter of state control over education, and end with Chandran Kukathas, 
whose strong diversity-based conception of liberalism leads him to eschew 
any state control over private education.  In between, I will discuss the more 
nuanced approaches of Eamonn Callan, Jeff Spinner-Halev, and William 
Galston.  Another relevant distinction which is worth noting between these 
theorists is between those who support government funding for private 
schools if it is accompanied by close regulation by the state, and those who 
object to government regulation of private religious schools but at the same 
time also object to government funding for such schools.  When discussing 
country case studies we will see that a similar distinction emerges in the 
practice of liberal states with respect to private religious schools.     
Brian Barry is a strong believer in the right and duty of the state to have a 
say in the way parents and communities educate their children, in order to 
safeguard both the interests of the state and the rights and interests of the 
child.58  As far as the interests of the state are concerned, Barry argues that 
                                                                                                                   
 55 The right to instill their values and lifestyle to their children is also part of the parents’ 
right to culture. 
 56 As will be discussed below, different theorists have different perspectives as to what an 
enabling education entails. 
 57 Galston, supra note 7, at 526–27. 
 58 BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY 209 (2001).  According to Barry there is no 
group right to the education of children, only the right of the parents.  Nevertheless, the group 
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all citizens have an interest in the future of their society and that the future of 
society, “including its economic prosperity, its social stability and even its 
continued existence as a distinctive entity, depends on the way in which 
those who are now children turn out.”59  In terms of the interests of the 
children, Barry argues that there are three aims that a proper education 
should fulfill.  The first aim of education, which Barry terms functional 
education, is to equip the child with the competences required to function 
successfully in the society into which she will grow up.60  The second aim of 
education, which Barry calls education for living, is to equip the child with 
knowledge that exceeds the functional knowledge needed to obtain a job and 
which allows the child to better understand the world around her, to develop 
an aesthetic appreciation and a critical capacity.61  The third aim of education 
according to Barry should be to develop in the child a capacity for 
autonomy.62  Barry supports a multicultural education insofar as it means that 
the curriculum is inclusive and pays attention to the various groups that exist 
in society.63  Nevertheless, he insists that all schools must have a common 
curriculum.  He is concerned that the proliferation of separatist schools 
which admit only students of certain ethnicities and religions and refuse to 
teach the common curriculum, will lead to the disintegration of society.  
According to him “there is, quite simply, little chance for a society to operate 
in a way that serves the long run interests of any of its members if it is 
divided up into mutually exclusive groups who have not only gone to 
different schools but have followed different curricula in them.”64  Barry’s 
emphasis on a common curriculum and on tight state regulation of both 
public and private schools can explain why he does not object to state 
funding of private schools and sees it as a question of only minor 
significance.  While he is willing to allow state funding for suitable private 
religious schools,65 he insists that private religious schools such as the 
Christian fundamentalist schools in the United States, which teach only 
creationism and whose biology textbook explains that evolutionary theory is 
                                                                                                                   
to which the parents belong has a crucial influence on the education that the children receive. 
Id. at 207. 
 59 Id. at 209. 
 60 Id. at 212–20. 
 61 Id. at 221–24. 
 62 Id. at 224–25. 
 63 Id. at 238. 
 64 Id. at 237. 
 65 Id. at 204–05. 
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a creation of Satan that is used effectively against Christians, must be shut 
down.66 
Eamonn Callan maintains that states should fund private religious 
education out of respect for parents’ right to educate their children according 
to their beliefs.  Nevertheless, he holds that states are entitled to give 
preference to public common education in order to promote the important 
state interest in civic education.  According to Callan, in their educational 
policies states should recognize religious groups with which individuals 
identify in order “to give equal respect to individual human beings whose 
very identity is constituted by different religious commitments.”67 
Nevertheless, his approach gives prominence to the ends of civic education.  
He posits that while religious education is important for the perpetuation of 
the religious identities of citizens, civic education is essential for the shared 
interest of all citizens in the continued existence of a liberal democratic state.  
Consequently, if the partiality of the state to common, secular public schools, 
serves the interests of civic education, then it is justified and should not be 
considered arbitrary.68 
Callan argues that the most important function of common schools is to 
enable children to engage in inclusive deliberation.69  He posits that in a 
pluralist society everybody has to be educated to give respect to others by 
making what Bernard Williams calls “the effort at identification.”70  Thus, in 
order to show respect to another, one must ensure that the other person 
“should not be regarded as the surface to which a certain label can be 
applied, but one should try to see the world (including the label) from his 
point of view.”71  This is a duty that all of us owe each other, regardless of 
                                                                                                                   
 66 Id. at 249. 
 67 Eamonn Callan, Discrimination and Religious Schooling, in CITIZENSHIP IN DIVERSE 
SOCIETIES 45, 50 (Will Kymlick & Wayne Norman eds., 2000). 
 68 Id. at 54–55.  Callan takes for granted that the state has an interest in maintaining its 
liberal democratic character, but in Israel this is the bone of contention.  If there is no 
agreement that the state needs to continue to be a liberal democracy, then the need for civic 
education can no longer justify either preference to public schools or impositions on private 
religious schools.  Here again it seems that the essence of the problem lies in Israel’s 
definition as a Jewish state—the UO can say “our education is certainly compatible with 
promoting the Jewishness of Israel and there is no agreement on its liberal democratic nature.”  
For too long the state assumed that it is enough that the UO promote the Jewish component of 
the state.    
 69 Id. at 61. 
 70 Id. at 60 (citing Bernard Williams, The Idea of Equality, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND 
SOCIETY 117 (W.G. Runciman & Peter Laslett eds., 3d series, 1969) (1967)). 
 71 Id. 
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our religious beliefs.  This effort of identification does not necessarily lead to 
affirmation of the others’ point of view, and it can lead to mutual criticism, 
as well as to self-criticism.72  Common schools have a unique contribution to 
civic education because they can serve as a forum for inclusive deliberation 
in which children are exposed to those who are different than themselves and 
engage with them.  In common schools children can participate in open 
discussions in which diverse opinions are voiced, debated, and evaluated, 
and through which they can evaluate the norms by which their communities 
live.73  According to Callan, while religious schools can encourage other 
aspects of civic education, they cannot serve as arenas for inclusive 
deliberation, which is a vital component of civic education.74   Consequently, 
he believes that in order to strike the proper balance between the important 
state interest in promoting civic education and the right of religious 
communities to religious education funded by the state, the state should fund 
private religious education for younger children (while carefully regulating 
it), but should refrain from funding religious schools in the later years of 
education in order to encourage more parents to send their children to 
common public schools.75 
Although, like the two preceding theorists, Jeff Spinner-Halev believes 
that autonomy is centrally important for liberal theory and society, he 
nevertheless believes that as long as the secular mainstream society supports 
autonomy and gives people a range of options to choose from, not every 
religious minority group has to support autonomy as well.  In his opinion, 
minority communities need not inculcate autonomy, because as long as their 
members are not being coerced and are not denied a decent education, their 
ability to see the different ways of life surrounding them suffices to make 
them able to choose.76  Thus, Spinner-Halev rejects arguments for cultural 
pluralism that are based on autonomy as arguments that wrongly undermine 
and restrict pluralism.77  
Spinner-Halev defends the right of parents to send their children to a 
private religious school in order to situate them in a community and enable 
                                                                                                                   
 72 Id. at 61. 
 73 Id. at 64. 
 74 Id. at 64 (citing J. Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD 
POLICY: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATE 31 (A. Hamlin & P. Petit eds., 1989)). 
 75 Id. at 66. 
 76 JEFF SPINNER-HALEV, SURVIVING DIVERSITY: RELIGION AND DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP 
50–51 (2000). 
 77 Id. at 55. 
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minority communities to retain their identities.78  Furthermore, he argues that 
it is important for children to be raised with specific values and have a strong 
base in a particular way of life, in order to be able, later on, to make a 
meaningful choice whether to change them.79  Thus, liberals should not 
worry about children who are raised into relatively closed communities with 
strong values, as long as at some point they are exposed to other ways of life.  
More worrisome to him is the situation of children who are raised with no 
worldview, because such children will not know how to choose one for 
themselves.80  
Nevertheless, in spite, or perhaps because, of his insistence that religious 
communities within liberal societies do not have to foster their members’ 
autonomy, Spinner-Halev is critical of private religious schools and 
emphasizes the importance of public schools.  He argues that an important 
problem with many religious schools is that they are not diverse and do not 
expose their students to a diversity of ideas or of ways of life.81  The 
exposure of students to diverse ideas and practices encourages them to think 
creatively, critically and autonomously.82   Consequently, public schools are 
important since they get children from different backgrounds together and 
enable them to learn about one another and to learn how to work together.  
Such experience prepares them better for citizenship in a complex, diverse, 
modern world.83  
Spinner-Halev further qualifies his defense of religious schools stating 
that it applies only to schools that are not all encompassing, that belong to 
moderate religious communities, and that do not stifle autonomy, but 
combine it with community.  According to him, “[a] community that tries to 
prevent its children from having any contact with outsiders, even as they 
become teenagers, is not combining autonomy and community.  It is using 
the community to stifle autonomy.”84  Furthermore, although he supports the 
existence of moderate religious schools, he believes that religious schools 
should not be funded by the state for two reasons. First, some of the religious 
schools are not moderate and do not encourage liberal citizenship, and direct 
                                                                                                                   
 78 See id. at 73. 
 79 Id. at 76. 
 80 Id.  
 81 Jeff Spinner-Halev, Extending Diversity: Religion in Public and Private Education, in 
CITIZENSHIP IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES, supra note 67, at 68. 
 82 Id. at 71. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 77. 
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funding to such schools “would harm the important cause of creating and 
sustaining a common citizenship.”85  Second, in order to encourage parents 
to send their children to public schools, which are inclusive and promote 
diversity, the state should refrain from financing private religious schools.86  
However, he believes that, in order to encourage religious parents to send 
their children to public schools, the schools should be willing to make some 
accommodations and to grant some exemptions from the standard curriculum 
for religious students upon their parents’ request.87  Thus, he believes that the 
Mozert case in which the court denied the request of fundamentalist parents 
to require a public school to exempt their children from various parts of the 
curriculum, including from texts which teach that girls are equal to boys or 
that teach evolution, was wrongly decided.88  In his opinion, the goal of 
exposing as many children as possible to the most liberal education possible 
is better achieved by giving partial exemptions to religious children that 
enable them to continue in the public school system than by denying such 
exemptions, thereby causing their parents to move them to a religious 
fundamentalist school or to homeschool them.89  
Unlike Barry and Callan, William Galston is situated firmly within the 
camp of diversity liberals, who reject autonomy as the liberal point of 
departure and instead offer “an account of liberalism that gives diversity its 
due.”90  Galston argues that taking diversity seriously in the educational 
context means that while any educational policy should balance between the 
rights and interests of parents, children and the state, the rebuttable 
presumption should be that the choices of parents with regard to the rearing 
of their children are immune from state interference.91  He posits that 
because parenting is one of the central meaning-giving tasks of our lives, and 
because every parent hopes to create relations of intimacy with his children, 
the ability of parents to raise their children in a manner consistent with their 
deepest commitments is an essential element of their liberty that should be 
respected by the state.92  Educational diversity is important, not only out of 
                                                                                                                   
 85 Id. at 79. 
 86 Id. at 81. 
 87 Id. at 94. 
 88 Id. at 91; see Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (1987). 
 89 Spinner-Halev, supra note 81, at 93–94. 
 90 Galston, supra note 7, at 523–24. 
 91 William Galston, Parents, Government, and Children: Authority over Education in a 
Pluralist Liberal Democracy, 5 LAW & ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 284, 288 (2011). 
 92 Id. at 295. 
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respect to the rights of parents, but also because it is essential for the 
development of children’s individuality.93  
Nevertheless, while parents and communities have the right to educate 
children according to their beliefs and ways of life, and even to isolate them 
to some extent from outside influences, Galston maintains that there are 
important limits to this right. First, the education that parents provide for 
their children must ensure that children have more than a merely formal right 
of exit.  Thus, communities and parents cannot educate children “in ways 
that disempower individuals—intellectually, emotionally, or practically—
from living successfully outside their bounds.”94  States are allowed to insist 
that education develop what Galston calls “social rationality,” which is the 
kind of understanding needed to participate in the society, economy, and 
polity, and they are allowed to intervene against forms of education “that are 
systematically disenabling when judged against the norm.”95  Furthermore, 
according to Galston, in societies characterized by deep diversity of moral 
and religious views, educational freedom should be respected only “to the 
maximum extent consistent with the maintenance of civic unity and 
stability.”96  The state has the right to ensure that all children are taught that 
other citizens have the right to live according to understandings of the good 
life, which they themselves reject, and internalize norms of self-restraint and 
a principled refusal to use coercion in order to enforce their own way of 
life.97  Thus, according to Galston “the liberal state has a legitimate and 
compelling interest in ensuring that the convictions, competencies, and 
virtues required for liberal citizenship are widely shared.”98  
At the extreme end of the diversity camp Chandran Kukathas posits that 
the good society should downplay the role of the state in the education of 
subjects.  He argues that since two core principles of liberalism are toleration 
of diversity and limited government, it cannot be part of the purpose of the 
liberal state to educate its citizens or to shape their thinking.99  The state 
should allow communities to educate their children according to their own 
                                                                                                                   
 93 Id. at 299. 
 94 Id. at 301. 
 95 Galston, supra note 7, at 525. 
 96 Galston, supra note 91, at 305. 
 97 Id. at 295. 
 98 Galston, supra note 7, at 529. 
 99 Chandran Kukathas, Education and Citizenship in Diverse Societies, 35 INT’L J. EDUC. 
RES. 319, 321–22 (2001). 
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beliefs, although it need not subsidize such education.100  Furthermore, the 
state should even allow communities such as the gypsies, that do not value 
schooling and that believe that they can educate their children satisfactorily 
through informal instruction in the ways of their culture, not to send their 
children to school at all.101  Kukathas objects to any form of civic education:  
[T]he liberal state is one that is held to a very exacting 
standard.  It must tolerate in its midst those who would work 
towards its destruction. And it must resist the temptation to turn 
its fiercest critics into compliant believers in the liberal creed.  
The last thing a liberal state should offer its subjects is 
education—even if that should be a liberal education.102 
He criticizes the position that a liberal polity must educate citizens to 
participate in a shared political framework and to affirm shared political 
principles, such as the obligation to respect the rights of fellow citizens 
regardless of their religious convictions.103  To the contrary, he argues, “what 
characterizes a liberal political order is not shared political commitments but 
institutions which enable people whose moral, religious, cultural and 
political commitments differ.”104 According to Kukathas, it is hard to see 
how the same political order that allows people to hold illiberal and even 
anti-liberal views, and allows them to proselytize those views and even run 
for office on their basis, can justify inculcating particular liberal values or 
virtues in its citizens.  As he succinctly puts it “Liberalism does not run re-
education camps.”105  Kukathas rejects the conviction that liberal citizens do 
not come into existence naturally but have to be made.  He believes that 
liberal citizens do, in fact, emerge ‘naturally’ in all liberal societies—and 
“even in societies in which liberal freedoms are only weakly honored . . .”—
                                                                                                                   
 100 CHANDRAN KUKATHAS, THE LIBERAL ARCHIPELAGO: A THEORY OF DIVERSITY AND 
FREEDOM 162 (2003). 
 101 Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights, 20 POLITICAL THEORY 105, 126 
(1992). 
 102 Kukathas, supra note 99, at 323. 
 103 Id. at 326–27. 
 104 Id. at 328.  This is of course facetious because the question is how to guarantee that these 
institutions go on existing if people are not committed to their pluralist and egalitarian nature.  
In his conclusion, Kukathas suggests that perhaps liberalism should not be as sanguine as he 
seems to suggest that it should be, but for some reason this does not change his conclusions. 
Id. at 330. 
 105 Id. at 328. 
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and that liberal societies can survive even when many of their citizens are not 
committed to liberalism and do not take any interest in politics 
whatsoever.106  Kukathas is very clear in his emphasis on toleration and in 
his critique of the limits placed on communities.  Nevertheless, while failing 
to qualify the sweeping toleration he advocates, he is careful to note that 
such qualifications are due,107 and that his theory is probably not feasible for 
any actual liberal state.108 
To conclude, we see that among the theorists discussed, those who 
support government funding for private schools insist that it should be 
accompanied by close regulation by the state, while those who object to 
government regulation of private religious schools also object to government 
funding for such schools.  Thus, despite their widely diverging views it 
seems that none of the theorists discussed would support the current 
treatment of UO education in Israel, which is given extensive funding by the 
state but has complete freedom to decide the content of its curriculum.  
Furthermore, with the exception of Kukathas, all the theorists discussed 
believe that children have the right either to receive education for autonomy 
or at least to receive an education that will enable them to exit their 
community later on in life if they choose to do so.  It seems that the 
education that boys in the UO community receive, which is focused entirely 
on religious studies and eschews any civic education, is precisely the type of 
education that prevents them from having any meaningful right of exit. 
B.  Comparative Perspectives 
In what follows I will discuss private religious education in five countries, 
three of which are liberal democracies—the Netherlands, the U.K. and the 
U.S.—and two non-liberal democracies—Malaysia and Turkey, one of 
which is avowedly religious while the other avowedly secular.  I chose to 
examine these particular countries because, in addition to their varied 
constitutional structures and ideological commitments, in all of them the 
question of private religious education (especially Muslim education) has 
been a cause for public debate and concern.  The discussion will show that 
the two models of state treatment of private religious education that exist in 
                                                                                                                   
 106 Id. at 329. 
 107 Id. at 329–30.  
 108 KUKATHAS, supra note 100, at 267.  In this book Kukathas puts forth a liberal theory 
based on the primacy of toleration, which he calls the liberal archipelago.  Nevertheless, in the 
conclusion of the book he concedes the impracticability of his theory for actual liberal states.    
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liberal countries are either state funding accompanied by close regulation 
(the Netherlands and the U.K.) or no state funding with limited regulation 
(the U.S.).  Despite their markedly different treatment of religion, both non-
liberal countries exhibit a similar model of close regulation with almost no 
government funding.  The comparison that follows between these five 
countries and Israel highlights both how unique the Israeli model of 
extensive funding for UO education with almost no regulation is, and how 
the problem is exacerbated by Israel’s unique state-religion relations.    
1.  The Netherlands 
The educational system in the Netherlands is characterized by a dual 
system of education that allows for the existence of a large number of private 
schools that are fully funded by the state alongside a system of public 
schools.  This unique system is a result of the process of pillarization which 
occurred in the Netherlands at the beginning of the twentieth century and 
which led to the segregation of Dutch society into pillars along religious and 
ideological lines, each pillar containing its own political parties, labor 
unions, hospitals, media, clubs, schools, etc.109 while a process of de-
pillarization has occurred in the Netherlands since the 1960s, the educational 
system has remained divided along denominational lines.  Thus, in 2005 only 
33% of the primary schools in the Netherlands were public, 30% were 
Protestant, 30% were Roman Catholic, and the rest belonged to other 
denominations and ideologies such as Islamic schools and Montessori 
schools.110  The freedom of education is guaranteed in article 23 of the Dutch 
constitution.  According to the article, “[a]ll persons shall be free to provide 
education,” but this right is subject to the right of the authorities to supervise 
the schools, “to examine the competence and the moral integrity of the 
teachers,” and to set the standards required of schools through acts of 
parliament.111  The supervision of private schools must be done “with due 
regard . . . to the freedom to provide education according to religious or other 
belief.”112  “Private primary schools that satisfy the conditions laid down by 
                                                                                                                   
 109 Geert Driessen & Michael S. Merry, Islamic Schools in the Netherlands: Expansion or 
Marginalization?, 37 INTERCHANGE 201, 203 (Nov. 2006). 
 110 Id. 
 111 GRONDWET VOOR HET KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN [GW] [Constitution] Feb. 17 1983, 
art. 23, §§ 2, 5 (Neth.), available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/nl00000_.html.  
 112 Id. art. 23, § 5. 
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acts of parliament” are entitled to public funds equal to those received by 
public schools.113  
The constitutional right to freedom of education had enabled the 
Muslim community in the Netherlands to establish Islamic schools, and as 
of 2006 there were forty-six Islamic primary schools and two Islamic 
secondary schools in the Netherlands.  Rather strict conditions have to be 
met in order to establish a fully funded private school and the existing 
schools do not meet the demand for Islamic schools within the Muslim 
community and are attended by only about 10% of Muslim primary school 
children.114  Strict requirements have to be met not only in order to 
establish a funded school but also in order to ensure its continued 
funding.115  Thus, although private schools have rather extensive autonomy 
in determining what is taught and how, this autonomy is restricted by 
qualitative and quantitative standards that private schools have to meet, 
including teacher qualifications, curriculum requirements, and, in 
secondary schools, “the examination syllabus and the national 
examinations.”116  The requirement that schools must employ only teachers 
that hold certain degrees and qualifications has proven to be quite 
significant in the context of Islamic schools and has resulted in teachers in 
these schools being mostly non-Muslims.117  While religious schools may 
deviate from government attainment targets and substitute them with their 
own targets if they can show that this is necessary from their religion’s 
perspective, the substitute targets must be equivalent in quality.  This 
means, for example, that a school will probably not be allowed to replace 
the teaching of the theory of evolution with the teaching of creationism 
because the latter will not be regarded the equivalent of the former.118  
                                                                                                                   
 113 Id. art. 23, § 7. 
 114 Driessen & Merry, supra note 109, at 204.  
 115 There are private schools that do not meet the criteria and are therefore not government 
funded.  Currently, approximately 1% of all primary and secondary schools are not 
government funded.  The Ministry of education visits these schools regularly.  It does not 
evaluate their educational process, “but checks are performed by specially trained inspectors 
to make sure the schools comply with legal obligations, such as the minimum amount of 
teaching time and attainment targets.”  The Dutch Inspectorate of Educ., MINISTRY OF EDUC., 
CULTURE & SCI., http://www.onderwijsinspectie.nl/english (last visited May 25, 2014). 
 116 Ben P. Vermeulen, Regulating School Choice to Promote Civic Values: Constitutional 
and Political Issues in the Netherlands, in EDUCATING CITIZENS: INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIC VALUES AND SCHOOL CHOICE 31, 46 (Wolf et al. eds., 2004). 
 117 Id. at 42. 
 118 Id. at 48. 
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Since the late 1980s, the existence of private Islamic schools has 
generated public discussions in the Netherlands concerning the desirability of 
such schools.119  While opponents feared that such schools would hinder the 
integration of Muslim immigrants into Dutch society by considerably 
diminishing the contact of Muslim children with native Dutch children, their 
proponents argued that these schools would promote the social integration of 
Muslims while allowing them to maintain their own identity.120 After the 
attacks of September 11, 2001 against the United States, the influence of 
political Islam on Islamic schools and its consequences for the integration of 
Muslim children into Dutch society became a central theme of the public 
debate surrounding these schools.121  Inspections in Islamic schools done by 
the Ministry of Education concluded that the quality of the religion classes 
and the religion teachers left much to be desired in many of the schools.  
This was not surprising since, at the time, teachers of religious classes were 
the only teachers who did not have to comply with any legal conditions 
(diplomas or other qualifications), and the classes lacked curriculum and 
method.122  Consequently, in the beginning of the 2007 academic year, all 
Dutch Islamic primary schools were provided with an official Islamic 
teaching curriculum, which was developed by the Foundation for Teaching 
Methods (SLO) and the Board of Islamic Schools Organization (ISBO)—an 
umbrella organization of forty-two Muslim schools in the Netherlands.123  At 
the same time, new legal requirements that require Islamic Studies teachers 
to have teacher diplomas were put into effect.124  
The Dutch “rejection of the state as a moral educator” has led to the 
absence of a separate subject of citizenship education from the national 
curriculum for many years.125  However, after concerns were raised as to the 
ability of Islamic schools to further integration and to inculcate pluralist and 
democratic values, the Primary Education Act and the Secondary Education 
Act were amended to require schools to offer education that is aimed at 
                                                                                                                   
 119 Wasif A. Shadid & Peter Sjoerd Van Koningsveld, Islamic Religious Education in the 
Netherlands, 38 EUROPEAN EDUCATION 76, 83 (2006). 
 120 Id. at 84. 
 121 Id. at 85. 
 122 Id. at 86. 
 123 Lisa Baughn, Islamic Education in Europe, EURO-ISLAM.INFO, http://www.euro-islam.in 
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developing active citizenship and social integration.  As with other curricular 
subjects, schools are free to shape their own citizenship education 
curriculum, but must present it to the Ministry of Education, which is 
charged with monitoring and evaluating it.126  
To conclude, the state in the Netherlands gives extensive funding to 
private religious schools but, at the same time, closely monitors them in 
order to ensure that they meet the state’s qualitative standards.  The concern 
for social integration and adherence to democratic values, brought about by 
the relative expansion of Muslim schools, has led the state to introduce 
citizenship education as a mandatory subject in all schools.   
2.  Britain 
In England there are approximately 6,900 maintained faith schools that 
make up one-third of all state-maintained schools.127  The overwhelming 
majority of these schools belong to Christian denominations, such as the 
Church of England and the Catholic Church.  Only around fifty maintained 
faith schools are non-Christian, thirty-seven of which are Jewish.128  Most of 
the maintained faith schools are Voluntary Aided, while others are Voluntary 
Controlled.129  Voluntary Aided schools are funded up to 90% by the state 
and local authorities while the rest of their budget comes from the religious 
bodies with which they are affiliated.130  The governing bodies of maintained 
faith schools have control over school admissions and the teaching of 
religious education.131  Nevertheless, all state-maintained schools must fully 
                                                                                                                   
 126 BERTHOLD VAN LEEUWEN, SLO NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT, 
INCLUSIVE EDUCATION IN THE NETHERLANDS 44 (2007). 
 127 ROB BERKELEY, THE RUNNYMEDE TRUST 11 (2008), available at http://www.runnymedet 
rust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/RightToDivide-2008.pdf.  Note that this number refers only 
to schools in England while Britain is composed of England, Wales, and Scotland.  However, 
since the vast majority of Muslims in Britain reside in England, the arrangements concerning 
faith schools in England are those that are most relevant to my concerns.  See British Muslims 
in Numbers A Demographic, Socio-economic and Health Profile of Muslims in Britain 
drawing on the 2011 Census, The Muslim Council of Britain, 16 (2015), http://www.mcb.org. 
uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/MCBCensusReport_2015.pdf. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Damian Breen, A Qualitative Narrative of the Transition from Independent to Voluntary 
Aided Status: A Problem for the Concept of the ‘Muslim School,’ in ISLAM IN EDUCATION IN 
.EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: PEDAGOGICAL CONCEPTS AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS, supra note 124, at 
95–96 
 131 KERRY O’HALLORAN, RELIGION, CHARITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 169 (2014) 
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incorporate the national curriculum.132  In recent years there has been an 
extensive public debate in England regarding the role of faith schools in 
society and the continued, and even increasing, government funding of such 
schools.  Faith schools have been accused of undermining social cohesion 
and heightening segregation along class, faith, and ethnic lines; using unfair 
admissions policies that favor socio-economically privileged families; and 
religious indoctrination.133  Supporters of faith schools have argued that faith 
schools further the common good, give children a sense of their own identity 
and promote choice, diversity, moral values and discipline.134  While the 
events of 9/11 played a role in the debate, Muslim state-maintained schools 
were not the focus of the debate, since they are only a miniscule part of the 
faith maintained schools in England.135  
There are about half a million Muslim children in British schools, and 
they comprise between 5% and 6% of the total school population.136  The 
vast majority of Muslim children attend public community schools or Church 
schools, and “only [around 1%] of the Muslim children are educated in 
independent or state-maintained Muslim schools.”137  Britain has 127 
independent Islamic schools, the most in any European country.138  Since 
Muslim independent schools do not receive any state funding, they are 
usually small and suffer from severe financial limitations.139  A number of 
Islamic independent schools have applied in recent years for state funding, 
but since the process is extensive and often depends on political power 
relations, only eleven schools have managed to gain a Voluntary Aided 
status.140  The structural, legal, and political obstacles to the inclusion of a 
large number of Muslim schools in the state sector have been exacerbated by 
the public debate over state support for faith schools.141  
While Voluntary Aided schools must fully incorporate the national 
curriculum, independent Muslim schools can determine their own curriculum 
but have to meet academic standards that are checked through periodic 
                                                                                                                   
 132 Breen, supra note 130, at 105. 
 133 BERKELEY, supra note 127, at 18. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 3, 45. 
 136 Niehaus, supra note 124, at 114.  
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Breen, supra note 130, at 101. 
 140 Niehaus, supra note 124, at 114–15 n.4. 
 141 Id. at 115. 
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inspections and compulsory national tests.142  The Independent School 
Standards regulations require independent schools to provide their students 
with an education that, among other things, “gives pupils experience in 
linguistic, mathematical, scientific, technological, human and social, physical 
and aesthetic and creative education” and that ensures “adequate preparation 
of pupils for the opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of adult 
life.”143  In addition, the independent school must educate its students to 
respect the law and to contribute to the community, and it must “provide 
pupils with a broad general knowledge of public institutions and services in 
England; [and] assist pupils to acquire an appreciation of and respect for 
their own and other cultures in a way that promotes tolerance and harmony 
between different cultural traditions.”144  
All independent schools, including independent faith schools, go through 
periodic inspections and may face closure if they fail to meet the required 
standards.145  In a case involving a Jewish Hasidic private school that was 
threatened with closure for not teaching any secular subjects, it was held that 
in general, in order to be considered “suitable,” education must “prepare the 
children for life in modern civilised society” and “enable them to achieve 
their full potential.”146  Nevertheless, education by independent faith schools 
of religious communities will be considered ‘suitable’  
if it primarily equips a child for life within the community of 
which he is a member, rather than the way of life in the country 
as a whole, as long as it does not foreclose the child’s options 
in later years to adopt some other form of life if he wishes to do 
so.147 
                                                                                                                   
 142 Id. 
 143 The Education (Independent School Standards) Regulations, 2010, S.I. 2010/1997, sched. 
1, pt. 1 (Eng.). 
 144 Id. at pt. 2. 
 145 JANE FORTIN, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING LAW 423 n.124 (3d ed. 2009) 
(reporting that forty-five independent schools were closed between 2004 and 2007, including 
one Muslim school). 
 146 Harrison & Harrison v. Stevenson [1981] (unreported), Worcester Crown Ct., available 
at http://freedom.edyourself.org/edact.htm. 
 147 Id.; R v. Sec’y of State for Educ. & Sci. [1985] (unreported). 
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Consequently, the school was obliged to implement a secular curriculum, 
which it was required to further amend following continual inspection, until 
its secular curriculum was found to be satisfactory.148  
In order to meet the standards set by the regulations, as well as for lack of 
financial resources, many of the independent Muslim schools follow the 
national curriculum and use existing textbooks, although the more 
conservative schools leave out aspects of the curriculum that are regarded by 
them as ‘un-Islamic,’ such as music, dance and figurative arts.149  The 
independent Muslim schools vary in their educational approaches and in 
their level of religious observance, but all of them offer Islamic education 
through special Islamic instruction, communal prayers, special dress codes, 
and observance of the Islamic calendar.150  Unlike in the Netherlands, in 
Britain most of the staff in Islamic schools are themselves Muslim, and thus 
it is easier for them to create and maintain an exclusive Muslim 
environment.151  Following the 9/11 attacks and the increasing concerns that 
Islamic schools might isolate Muslim children from the larger society, a new 
citizenship curriculum was introduced in British schools in 2002 and in 
2007, and Voluntary Aided schools were required “to actively 
promote . . . social cohesion.”152  This is done through participation in a 
“citizenship and social cohesion” program, which is compulsory for all state-
funded schools, and through other measures such as student exchange 
programs between Muslim and non-Muslim schools and community 
outreach programs.153  Some studies show that, while in the past educators 
and parents have emphasized the role of Islamic schools in the process of 
islamization of their students, the current focus of many Islamic schools is on 
providing good academic results in a supportive environment that will enable 
                                                                                                                   
 148 The Office for Standards in Education inspected the school in 2007 and found that while 
its religious curriculum was good, its secular curriculum was unsatisfactory in several respects 
and had to be expanded and improved. (OFSTED, TTMH BELZ DAY SCHOOL: INSPECTION 
REPORT (2007), available at http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/inspection-reports/find-inspection-rep 
ort/provider/ELS/100294).  A subsequent inspection in 2010 found that a new secular 
curriculum had been introduced and that the secular curriculum was now satisfactory 
(OFSTED, TALMUD TORAH MACHZIKEI HADASS AT THE WODLANDS: INDEPENDENT SCHOOL 
STANDARD INSPECTION REPORT (2010), available at http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/inspection-repo 
rts/find-inspection-report/provider/ELS/100294). 
 149 Niehaus, supra note 136, at 117–18. 
 150 Id. at 116. 
 151 Id.  
 152 Id. at 121. 
 153 Id. at 122. 
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the students to prepare for their roles in the job market and as active 
citizens.154 
To conclude, while in Britain as in the Netherlands, the state is willing to 
give extensive funding to faith-based schools (although in practice mostly 
Christian schools enjoy this funding), it also monitors these schools closely, 
including requiring them to teach the full national curriculum and a 
“citizenship and social cohesion program.”  Independent faith schools are 
relatively few in number, and although they are not required to teach the 
national curriculum, they are inspected to ensure that they give children an 
adequate education that includes secular studies and teaches tolerance and 
harmony between different cultural groups.   
3.  The United States 
In 1925, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the U.S. Supreme Court struck 
down an Oregon law that made it mandatory for parents to send their 
children to public schools, holding that:  
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments 
in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to 
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction 
from public teachers only.  The child is not the mere creature of 
the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the 
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him 
for additional obligations.155 
Nevertheless, while parents have a fundamental liberty to give their children 
private religious education, the constitutional “wall of separation” between 
church and state was held to prohibit any direct government funding for 
private religious education.156  Even though the state cannot fund private 
religious schools, it retains, under Pierce, the power  
reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise, and 
examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all 
children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall 
be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that 
                                                                                                                   
 154 Id. at 125. 
 155 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
 156 E.g., Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Tp., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).  
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certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be 
taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical 
to the public welfare.157 
The Supreme Court has never specified what kind of state regulation of 
private schools constitutes “reasonable” regulation, but, in general, the 
regulation in the United States is less intrusive and less comprehensive than 
the regulation in Europe.158  An important reason for the lax regulation of 
private religious schools is the fear that tighter regulation will create an over-
entanglement of government with religion and violate the free exercise rights 
of religious communities.159  Nevertheless, most states impose various 
curricular requirements on private schools, regardless of their religious 
character or of the fact that they are not funded by the state.160  In the school 
year 2009–2010 there were almost 5.5 million students in private schools, 
80% of whom attended religiously affiliated schools.161  Students in private 
schools constitute around 10% of the students in the United States.162 
The strict prohibition on state funding for religious private schools has 
been narrowed in recent years.  In an important 2002 decision, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that a voucher program which gives parents tuition aid 
through vouchers which they can use towards tuition costs in any private 
school of their choice, including private religious schools, does not violate 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.163  
This decision has paved the way for indirect government funding of private 
religious schools.164  The Ohio program approved by the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                   
 157 Pierce, 286 U.S. at 534. 
 158 Richard W. Garnett, Regulatory Strings and Religious Freedom: Requiring Private 
Schools to Promote Public Values, in EDUCATING CITIZENS: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
CIVIC VALUES AND SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 116, at 324, 329; see also REICH, supra note 
53, at 147. 
 159 John F. Witte, Regulation in Public and Private Schools in the United States, in 
EDUCATING CITIZENS: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIC VALUES AND SCHOOL CHOICE, 
supra note 116, at 355, 360. 
 160 Catherine J. Ross, Fundamentalist Challenges to Core Democratic Values: Exit and 
Homeschooling, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 991, 992 (2010) (citing Eric A. DeGroff, State 
Regulation of Nonpublic Schools: Does the Tie Still Bind?, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 363, 393).  
For a court case rejecting a challenge to state supervision of private schools see Fellowship 
Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 161 Facts and Studies, COUNCIL FOR AMERICAN PRIVATE EDUCATION, http://www.capenet. 
org/facts.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).    
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 163 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 164 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
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required participating private schools to meet statewide educational 
standards, to agree not to discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic 
background, and not to “advocate or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred 
of any person or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or 
religion.”165  Despite the considerable entanglement of the state in religious 
messages that this form of state supervision over religious private schools 
that accept vouchers might require, the Court did not strike down these 
requirements.  However, while it seems that the U.S. Constitution does not 
forbid such supervision of private religious voucher schools, it does not 
require it either.  Consequently, it is up to the individual states to decide what 
sort of conditions to attach to their voucher programs, and this can 
potentially open the way to indirect state funding of private religious schools 
that do not meet educational standards and that teach discrimination and 
hatred.  While this should certainly be of concern, the small number of 
children currently participating in voucher programs in the U.S. makes this 
concern less pressing.166  
In addition to private religious schools, home schooling is a second form 
of private education, which is mostly religious and which has grown 
considerably in recent years in the United States.  It is estimated that around 
1.5 million children (almost 3% of school-aged children) are being 
homeschooled in the U.S.167  Almost 90% of the parents who homeschool 
their children do so because of their religious beliefs.168  Most of them “have 
religious objections to placing their children in a public, or even a private, 
school environment.”169  Homeschooling is dominated by conservative 
Christian parents, although other deeply religious parents are also 
increasingly turning to homeschooling.170  Interestingly, the number of 
homeschooled children is almost double the number of children in private, 
conservative Christian schools,171 a fact which seems to indicate that 
conservative Christian parents have a preference for homeschooling.  Several 
state and federal courts have rejected the claim that homeschoolers are 
                                                                                                                   
 165 Id. at 645 (internal quotations omitted). 
 166 According to data from the school year 2008–2009, only 171,000 students in the U.S. 
participated in voucher programs.  Council for American Private Education, Stimulus Plan 
Provides Mixed Results for Private Schools, 343 CAPE OUTLOOK 3 (2009), available at 
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 167 Ross, supra note 160, at 996. 
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constitutionally entitled to complete freedom from state supervision.172  For 
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected a claim by 
conservative Christian parents against Pennsylvania’s homeschooling 
laws.173  Pennsylvania requires parents who are homeschooling their children 
to provide instruction for a minimum number of days and hours in certain 
subjects and to submit a portfolio of teaching logs and the children’s work 
product for review.  In addition, it requires homeschooled children to take 
“nationally normed standardized achievement tests in reading/language arts 
and mathematics” in grades three, five, and eight, or to take statewide tests 
administered at these levels.174  The parents claimed that the state’s 
supervision violates their right to freedom of religion since it is their 
sincerely held religious belief that God has given them the exclusive 
responsibility for educating their children.175  The court rejected the claim, 
holding that “the particular right asserted in this case—the right to be free 
from all reporting requirements and ‘discretionary’ state oversight of a 
child’s home-school education—has never been recognized.”176  
Nevertheless, in most states in the U.S. homeschooling is significantly less 
regulated than private schools, and in some states such as Alaska, it is not 
regulated at all.177  The considerable number of homeschooled children, 
coupled with the fact that most of the parents choose to homeschool their 
children in order to prevent their exposure to different world views and to 
critical thinking, has raised concerns regarding these children’s lack of civic 
education and especially their lack of “exposure to the constitutional norm of 
tolerance.”178   
To conclude, while the regulation of private schooling in the U.S. is lax 
and that of homeschooling is minimal or non-existent, these forms of 
schooling are not funded by the state, and where private schools are partially 
funded through vouchers their regulation is tighter.  The fact that private 
schooling is not funded by the state can explain its relatively small size and 
serve as a partial check on the expansion of forms of religious education that 
might be inimical to the interests of children and of the liberal state.       
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4.  Malaysia 
Unlike the countries discussed so far, Malaysia is not a secular liberal 
democracy but an Islamic federation.  Article 3 of the Malaysian constitution 
states that “Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religions may be 
practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation.”179  Around 
40% of Malaysia’s population is non-Muslim.180  Religion and ethnicity are 
closely intertwined in Malaysia, and while the country maintains a façade of 
interracial harmony and religious pluralism, clear preference is given in the 
constitution and in federal law to the Malay ethnic group, who are generally 
Muslims.181  While Islam has always played an important role in Malaysian 
politics and public sphere this role has increased in recent years as the 
increasingly successful PAS opposition party has pushed a stricter form of 
Islam to counter the ruling UNMO party’s more moderate form (Islam 
Hadhari or civilizational Islam).182  As will be discussed below, this struggle 
has also had implications for Islamic education in Malaysia. 
The Malaysian constitution guarantees individual religious freedom and 
the right of every religious group to manage its own religious affairs.183  
However, the constitution includes special provisions for Islam, which both 
give preference to Muslims but at the same time restrict their behavior.  For 
example, the constitution allows state and federal law to “restrict the 
propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the 
religion of Islam.”184  Consequently, it is forbidden to propagate non-Muslim 
religious doctrines to Muslims, and those wishing to propagate Muslim 
religious doctrines and beliefs to Muslims must obtain permission from state 
                                                                                                                   
 179 Constitution of Malaysia Aug. 27, 1957, Part I, art. 3. 
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religious departments.185  The control over the propagation of Muslim 
religious doctrines granted to the government in the constitution has enabled 
the government, among other things, to clamp down on dissident Muslim 
organizations and shut down their schools.186   
In terms of religious education, article 12 of the constitution states that: 
“Every religious group has the right to establish and maintain institutions for 
the education of children in its own religion, and there shall be no 
discrimination on the ground only of religion in any law relating to such 
institutions or in the administration of any such law.”187  Nevertheless, the 
article gives a clear preference to Islam over other religions with respect to 
state funding, stating that “it shall be lawful for the Federation or a State to 
establish or maintain or assist in establishing or maintaining Islamic 
institutions or provide or assist in providing instruction in the religion of 
Islam and incur such expenditure as may be necessary for the purpose.”188  
Consequently, only Muslim religious schools can be funded by the state in 
Malaysia.189  
The close ties between Malay identity and Islam, and the government’s 
resolve to affirm Malay hegemony, have led to the increasing importance of 
Islamic education and to attempts to systematize it within the national 
system.190  In 1961, Islamic education was incorporated into the curriculum 
of national primary and secondary schools, and this has “led to a . . . decline 
in enrollment in both state and private Islamic schools.”191  These changes 
were consistent with the policy of gradual absorption of Islamic educational 
institutions and practice into the broad national educational system, and with 
the increasing emphasis on Islam as a prominent part of the national Malay 
identity and culture.192  In 1973, a separate religious education division was 
established that is in charge of Islamic educational policy and curriculum, the 
recruitment of Islamic education staff, and the raising of standards in both 
national Islamic schools and government assisted Islamic schools.193  One of 
the goals of the Islamic Education Division is to take over state Islamic 
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schools and private Islamic schools and turn them into national Islamic 
schools with a uniform syllabus.194  
The nature of Malaysia’s private Islamic education has aided this process.  
Private Islamic schools in Malaysia are governed by independent boards, and 
their funds come from relatively low student fees and private contributions.  
However, due to financial difficulties many of these schools have turned to 
the government for financial assistance and have become semi-independent 
government-assisted Islamic schools.195  After 9/11, the pressure on private 
Islamic schools to conform to national authorities increased, and funding has 
been withdrawn from hundreds of schools.196  While some of these schools 
have closed for lack of funding, others have forgone their independence and 
become fully aided government Islamic schools.197  The private Islamic 
schools whose funding has been cut have been accused of stoking Islamic 
extremism and being tied to Islamic militants.198  In addition, the Malaysian 
government claimed that the non-religious curriculum in these schools was 
so deficient that it left the children graduating from them virtually 
unemployable.199  Furthermore, in order to persuade people not to enroll their 
children into these schools, the government claimed that while 90% of the 
graduates of government schools qualified for admission to Malaysian 
universities, less than 25% of the graduates of private Islamic schools were 
similarly qualified.200  However, critics claim that the main motivation for 
the funding cuts was political, as these schools were connected to the PAS 
opposition party that threatens the continued rule of the UNMO party.201  
The funding cut combined with the government’s campaign against the 
quality of private Islamic schools and the parallel expansion of the Islamic 
education curriculum in national schools have led to a sharp decline in 
enrolment in private Islamic schools.202  By 2004 these schools had suffered 
a decrease of more than 50% in their enrolment and their student body 
represented only 0.7% of the total student population in Malaysia.203  
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Following the Malaysian government’s Ninth Malaysian Plan for the years 
2006–2010, all private Islamic schools in Malaysia were required to adopt 
the official Islamic education curriculum, thereby creating a homogenous 
Islamic education curriculum in all Malaysian schools.204   
To conclude, Islam is given a prominent role in Malaysia, and the 
Malaysian constitution gives preference, power, and money to Islam and to 
Muslim religious authorities.  Nevertheless, the Malaysian legal system 
ensures that the state maintains complete control over the interpretation of 
Islam and over religious authority.  This state of affairs enables the 
government to dictate the form and content of Islamic education and to retain 
a high degree of control over private Islamic schools. 
5.  Turkey 
When the Republic of Turkey was proclaimed in 1923 religion was 
banished from the public sphere.205  Hundreds of religious Muslim schools 
(medreses) that were seen as incompatible with modern academic 
requirements were closed, and the state established compulsory schools that 
followed a national curriculum devoid of any religious instruction.206  
Although secularization was central to the Kemalist modernization project, 
and various Muslim practices such as the pilgrimage to Makkah (hajj) were 
banned by law until 1947, Islam continued to play an important role in the 
Kemalist understanding of the Turkish nation due to Islam’s importance as 
the “unspoken bond” that created the Turkish nation from a multitude of 
separate ethnic groups (including Anatolians, Kurds, Caucasians, Albanians, 
Bosnians Tartars, etc.).207  The introduction of democracy in 1946, along 
with the realization that the official ban on any form of religious education 
was leading many to seek it via channels over which the state has no control, 
led to the gradual reintroduction of religion into the public sphere and into 
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the state system of education.208  Consequently, the notion of laicism, which 
initially meant a complete ban on Islam, was transformed to mean the control 
of religious expression by the state, and the following years saw a gradual 
increase in state-controlled Islamic education.209  In the 1980s, the role of 
Islam in Turkish society strengthened further.  Islam was portrayed as a 
national trait of the Turks and as a source of social and moral stability, and 
obligatory religious courses were introduced in state schools.210  
Although Turkey is defined in its 1982 constitution as a secular state,211 
state control over Islamic education and its compulsory introduction into 
state schools are enshrined in the constitution.  Article 24 of the constitution 
stipulates that: “Religious and moral education and instruction shall be 
conducted under state supervision and control,” and determines that 
“instruction in religious culture and morals shall be . . . compulsory . . . in the 
curricula of primary and secondary schools.”212  The content of education 
and the control of the state over it are further guaranteed by article 42 of the 
constitution, which states that: “Education shall be conducted along the lines 
of the principles and reforms of Atatürk, on the basis on contemporary 
scientific and educational principles, under the supervision and control of the 
State.  Educational institutions contravening these provisions shall not be 
established.”  The article further stipulates that: “The freedom of training and 
education does not relieve the individual from loyalty to the Constitution,” 
and ensures the conformity of private education by requiring that “the 
principles governing the functioning of private primary and secondary 
schools shall be regulated by law in keeping with the standards set for the 
state schools.”213 
The secular state, through its Directorate for Religious Affairs, which 
controls 70,000 mosques and thousands of Qur’anic courses and supervises 
private forms of religious activities, is the most important religious player in 
Turkey.214  The compulsory religious instruction given in all state schools 
follows a relatively progressive form of Islam advanced by the state, which 
has been called “Turkish-Islamic-Synthesis,” and which is aimed at 
                                                                                                                   
 208 Id. at 152; see also Diren Çakmak, Pro-Islamic Public Education in Turkey: The Imam-
Hatıp Schools, 45 MIDDLE EASTERN STUD. 825, 829 (2009). 
 209 Agai, supra note 205, at 152.  
 210 Id. at 152–53; Çakmak, supra note 208, at 833. 
 211 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey Nov. 7, 1982, art. 2. 
 212 Id. art. 24.  
 213 Id. art. 42. 
 214 Agai, supra note 205, at 153–54. 
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undermining Islamic influences outside of state control and assisting in the 
project of national homogenization.215  The deep involvement of the Turkish 
secular state with religion has made it necessary for the state to have schools 
that can train students to perform religious functions in the community.  This 
has led the Turkish Ministry of Education to establish vocational schools for 
Imams (prayer-leaders) and Hatips (preachers)—the Imam Hatip Schools—
whose operation began in 1951.216  Imam Hatip schools teach the full 
curriculum that is taught in general high schools, while adding to it a 
considerable number of religious vocational courses, and initially they 
included both junior high school (6–8) and high school (9–12) grades.217  
While the state retains full control over Imam-Hatip schools, and provides 
the teachers, and pays for their salaries, all other school expenses are covered 
by private donations.218  The private donations given to these schools on the 
basis of their religious appeal are used to provide a better learning 
environment for the students, such as a better teacher-student ratio than in 
other public schools.219  The Imam-Hatip schools became very popular 
among the more pious Muslim parents, who seized the opportunity to send 
their children to a school that gave them both secular and religious education, 
and by the mid-1990s about 10% of all students in Turkey went to Imam-
Hatip schools.220  One reason for these schools’ popularity was that while 
they enabled their graduates to go on to become Imams and Hatips, they also 
enabled them to go on to study any university subject they desired, and 
graduates would usually achieve high scores on the central university entry 
exam.221 
The growing popularity of the Imam-Hatip schools has generated an 
extensive public debate regarding their desirability, with opponents arguing 
that these schools are a threat to Turkey’s laicism and a hotbed for political 
                                                                                                                   
 215 Id. at 156. 
 216 Çakmak, supra note 208, at 830; Mustafa Öcal, From the Past to the Present: Imam and 
Preacher Schools in Turkey—An Ongoing Quarrel, 102 RELIGIOUS EDUC. 191, 195 (2007). 
 217 Öcal, supra note 216, at 196. 
 218 Id. at 197. 
 219 Agai, supra note 205, at 154. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. Although women are not employed as Imams or Hatips, Imam-Hatip schools accepted 
girls and even had the highest proportion of girls of all high schools.  Id.; see also Çakmak, 
supra note 208, at 831–32.  This may be due to the fact that conservative parents felt it is safer 
to send their daughters to religious educational institutions, and Imam-Hatip schools are the 
only option for such education in Turkey. 
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Islam.222  These concerns have led, from 1997 onward, to the enactment of 
reforms that significantly restricted Imam-Hatip schools and their graduates.  
The first reform required all students to attend general, non-vocational, 
schools for the first eight years of their education, thereby canceling the 
junior high section of the Imam-Hatip schools.223  The second, even more 
significant reform, implemented in 1999, changed the admission criteria for 
universities, making it almost impossible for Imam-Hatip graduates to enter 
any department except for theology faculties.224  In addition, Imam-Hatip 
graduates were denied access to police schools and other sensitive 
positions.225  These measures resulted in a sharp drop in student enrolment 
and the closure of many Imam-Hatip schools.226  However, these reforms 
were recently overturned by the Turkish government led by the Justice and 
Development party (AKP).227 
To conclude, although the Turkish state is defined as a secular state, it 
employs a significant state apparatus to disseminate a state generated form of 
Islam, and retains tight control over Islamic education.  
C.  Lessons from Theory and from Comparative Law and Practice   
The review conducted above of theoretical literature on religious 
education and of the comparative law and practice of liberal and non-liberal 
countries reveals that while there are significant differences between the 
different theorists reviewed and between the different countries reviewed, 
some general conclusions that are pertinent to religious education in general 
and to the UO education in Israel in particular can be drawn.  
First, while in all surveyed countries there is, at least on the legal level, 
state control over private religious education, in the U.S. this control is less 
strict than in the other countries.  This can be explained both by the strong 
                                                                                                                   
 222 Agai, supra note 205, at 154; Öcal, supra note 216, at 197; Çakmak, supra note 208, at 
839–41.  Çakmak posits that the Imam-Hatip schools have made a significant contribution to 
the resurgence of Islamism in Turkey (many of Turkey’s current leaders are graduates of these 
schools) and that under the current rule of the Islamist Justice and Development Party they 
pose a more serious threat to Turkish democracy than in the past. 
 223 Agai, supra note 205, at 154–55. 
 224 Öcal, supra note 216, at 199. 
 225 Agai, supra note 205, at 154–55. 
 226 Id.; Çakmak, supra note 208, at 836. 
 227 M. Kemal Kaya & Halil M. Karaveli, Remolding Compulsory Education, the AKP 
Erases a Secularist Legacy—and Seeks to Check the Gülen Brotherhood, CTR. ASIA-
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constitutional separation between church and state, which prevents 
government entanglement with religion, and by the strong ethos of negative 
liberty and of small government, which reduces government involvement in 
the private sphere to a minimum.  Nevertheless, the same constitutional 
principles that restrict the control over religious education in the U.S. also 
work to prevent funding of religious schools.  In the Netherlands and in the 
U.K. where there is extensive funding for religious education there is also 
quite extensive control over this education and while in both countries there 
exists the option of running a private school with no state funding and with 
considerably less supervision, this option is utilized by very few.  In the non-
liberal democracies (Malaysia and Turkey) close supervision exists 
regardless of funding.  
Thus, in the three liberal democracies examined there is a direct link 
between the extent of funding and the extent of supervision.  A similar close 
relationship between funding and supervision can also be found among the 
liberal theorists reviewed.  This link is important, because it ensures that 
government money that is used to support and expand the private religious 
education system is not used towards purposes that are inimical to the liberal 
democratic state.  Unfortunately, this is not the case with the UO education 
system in Israel, which receives extensive funding despite its refusal to teach 
the core curriculum.  
Second, although the three liberal democratic countries surveyed differ in 
the amount of funding that they give religious education and have different 
degrees and methods of control, neither of their systems is considered 
incompatible with the right to religious freedom or with the right to culture.  
This is important from the perspective of UO education in Israel, whose 
supporters claim that despite the heavy funding that it receives from the state, 
any supervision of it and any enforcement of standards would be a violation 
of the parents’ religious freedom and of the community’s right to culture. 
Third, In the four countries in which Muslim education was surveyed—
England, Netherlands, Malaysia and Turkey—a major concern for parents in 
their choice of school is the need to give their children good secular 
education, in addition to religious education, in order to enable them to 
integrate in society and find good jobs in a modern economy.  Thus, the need 
to acquire sufficient skills to find good jobs has an important integrative and 
de-radicalizing role.  This need leads schools to maintain a high level of 
secular education and may even lead parents to withdraw their children from 
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schools that do not do so.228  Furthermore, most theorists discussed agree that 
a curriculum comprised exclusively of religious studies is inimical to the 
rights of children.  While Barry and Callan believe that children have the 
right to receive an education that develops their autonomy, Spinner-Halev 
and Galston settle for an education that guarantees the children’s right of exit 
in the sense that it enables them later on in life to live outside the community 
if they choose to do so.  The same concern for ensuring children’s right of 
exit was expressed by the Israeli court in the Core Curriculum cases and by 
the British court.229  Nevertheless, the current situation in the UO education 
in Israel, which has been reinforced and made legal by the Unique Cultural 
Educational Institutions Act, is that UO schools for boys teach exclusively 
religious studies, and that consequently, young UO adults have almost no 
option of exiting their community.230   
Fourth, most of the theorists discussed, except Kukathas, also emphasize 
the right and the duty of the liberal state to encourage and even ensure that 
children receive some form of civic education that educates them to tolerance 
and to life in a pluralistic diverse democratic society.  Similarly, in both 
England and the Netherlands such civic education is mandatory.  In the UO 
education system in Israel no such education is provided, despite the fact that 
one out of every four students in the Jewish education system studies in an 
UO school and that data shows that the UO community is the most intolerant 
towards diversity, markedly more so than other groups in Israel.231 
To summarize, the treatment of UO education in Israel is not required by 
the right to religious freedom of UO parents and community.  It also violates 
the right of UO children to education and to equal opportunity and 
jeopardizes the sustainability and the democratic structure of the state due to 
                                                                                                                   
 228 See discussions of Turkey, Britain, and Malaysia, supra Parts III.B.2, 4–5.  
 229 For the British court, see supra note 147 and accompanying text.  
 230 FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 188. 
 231 The 2010 Israeli Democracy Index recently published by the Israeli Institute for 
Democracy found that the greater the level of religious observance, the stronger the objection 
to equality of rights between Jews and Arabs.  Thus, one of the issues that the survey 
examined was to what extent the notion that citizenship is a legal status conferring equal rights 
has been internalized by the Israeli public.  According to the findings in the survey, while 51% 
of the general public support full equality of rights between Jews and Arabs, a breakdown of 
the Jewish public by religiosity shows that only 33.5% of secular Jews are opposed to such 
equal rights, in contrast to 51% of traditional Jews, 65% of religious Jews, and 72% of ultra-
Orthodox Jews who are opposed to equal rights.  These findings correspond to similar 
findings in earlier surveys.  Asher Arian et al., The Israel Democracy Institute 2010, Auditing 
Israeli Democracy—2010 Democratic Values in Practice, 8, available at http://www.idi.org. 
il/PublicationsCatalog/Documents/Book_7114/madad_2010_eng_abstract.pdf. 
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the inordinately high number of children who are not exposed to any form of 
secular and civic education.  I could finish here, but my claim against the 
right to an exclusively religious education granted to the UO through the 
Unique Cultural Educational Institutions Act runs deeper than that.  I claim 
that the state religion structure in Israel and the unique position of the UO 
community within this structure and in the Israeli polity significantly 
exacerbate the problem and that the comparative perspective can help us to 
understand this. 
Thus, the Fifth conclusion that can be drawn from the comparative 
analysis concerns countries in which religion plays an essential role in their 
national identity.  While the two non-liberal countries surveyed—Turkey and 
Malaysia—differ from each other markedly in their state religion relations, in 
both countries Islam is heavily entangled with the state and is used by the 
state as a unifying factor.  In this respect both countries resemble Israel, in 
which, as will be further discussed below, the Jewish religion plays a crucial 
role in its self-identity, and is heavily entangled with the state.  There is one 
crucial difference between the situation in Israel and that in Malaysia and in 
Turkey, which is highly relevant for our purposes.  Because Malaysia and 
Turkey acknowledge and promote the importance of Islam in their national 
life and its power over the population, they control Islam tightly, limiting 
dissent and endorsing a unitary version of a state controlled religion.  While 
this state of affairs is illiberal and disrespectful of individual rights, it is 
effective in preventing the power of religion from being turned against the 
state.  Conversely, Israel, while emphasizing the importance of the Jewish 
religion to the national ethos and giving the Orthodox Jewish religion both 
state power and state budgets, refrains from controlling it.  This is because 
controlling religion in the way that Malaysia and Turkey do would go against 
another important component of Israel’s ethos—the liberal component. 
Consequently, Israel emerges as a unique hybrid which attempts to reconcile 
two irreconcilable ideals: on the one hand it gives considerable state power 
and state funds to its preferred religion—Orthodox Judaism (and is therefore 
an instance of what Hirschl calls a constitutional theocracy), but on the other 
hand, and at the same time, it attempts to respect liberal ideals such as 
religious freedom in all areas not directly under the control of religious law. 
Tellingly, as will be discussed below, the failure of this theocratic-liberal 
hybridity does not manifest itself through Israel’s relatively decent treatment 
of its Muslim and Christian minorities, but through its unremitting, and 
indeed exaggerated, respect to the religious freedom of adherents of its 
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dominant religion—Orthodox Judaism—of which the UO Jewish minority is 
an important component.  
In the next part of the Article I will describe how the combination of state 
power and state funds for Orthodox Judaism coupled with extensive freedom 
for its adherents to pursue and to radicalize their religious beliefs has resulted 
in the UO’s minority exponential growth and in its radicalization to an extent 
that today poses a threat to the liberal democratic ideals on which Israel is 
based and requires a change of policy towards the UO education system.    
IV.  UO EDUCATION IN ISRAEL—AN ANALYSIS    
In order to explain the uniqueness of the Israeli situation and the depth of 
the problem that the current status of the UO educational system poses for 
Israel, it is important first to give a short overview of state-religion relations 
in Israel. 
A.  State-religion Relations in Israel   
Unlike most other liberal democratic states, whose definitions do not 
include references to the ethnic or religious character of those states, Israel is 
defined in its Basic Laws as a Jewish and Democratic state.  This definition 
is relatively new and was adopted as part of the first of two Basic Laws on 
human rights—Basic Law: Human Dignity and Basic Law: Freedom of 
Occupation.232  However, the origins of this definition can be traced to the 
Israeli declaration of Establishment, which states that Israel is to be a 
“Jewish state,” but at the same time that it will “ensure complete equality of 
social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or 
sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education 
and culture.”233  It is important to note that there is an ongoing and as of yet 
unsettled debate with regard to the exact meaning of the definition of Israel 
as a Jewish state. While some consider that the definition of Israel as a 
Jewish state mandates an establishment of the Jewish religion in the state, 
and the granting of legal authority and status to the Jewish religion, others 
                                                                                                                   
 232 Basic Law: Human Dignity & Liberty, 5752-1992, SH No. 1391, p. 60 (Isr.), available at 
http://knesset.gov/il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm; Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 
5752-1992, SH No. 187, p. 60 (Isr.) (null), available at http://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/ 
basic5_eng.htm. 
 233 The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, Iyar 5, 5708 – May 14, 1948, 
Official Gazette No. 1 p. 1, available at http://Knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/megilat_eng.htm. 
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dispute this reading of the Basic Laws.  They argue that the definition 
“Jewish state” should be understood as a national definition designating the 
character of Israel as the home of the Jewish people, where Jews realize their 
right to self-determination, and not as an establishment of the Jewish religion 
in the state.234  Regardless of this debate and long before the enactment of the 
Basic Laws, the Jewish religion in its Orthodox version has been partially 
established in the state through laws granting legal status to Orthodox Jewish 
religious authorities in several areas, the most important of these being that 
of personal laws.  This partial establishment originates in the pre-state era 
and in the need of the leaders of the Zionist movement to secure the support 
of the religious factions within the Jewish community for the establishment 
of the Jewish state, and it has come to be known as the “Status Quo.”235  
Some argue that this partial establishment was also motivated by the need of 
the new Zionist secular regime to gain legitimization by maintaining a 
connection with the Jewish past.236  Be that as it may, the Israeli model of 
state-religion relations, which, from the outset, has given substantial 
preference to the Orthodox Jewish religion, deviates from the classical liberal 
model that aspires to treat all religions equally and neutrally. 
The most important aspect of the partial establishment of Orthodox 
Judaism is that all Jews in Israel are subject to Orthodox Jewish religious 
personal laws.  At the same time, it is important to note that members of 
other recognized religious communities, such as Muslims and various 
Christian denominations, are also subject to the personal religious laws of 
their particular religions.237  This state of affairs was first instituted during 
                                                                                                                   
 234 See Avigdor Levontin, Jewish and Democratic: Some Personal Reflections, in THE 
STATE OF ISRAEL: BETWEEN JUDAISM AND DEMOCRACY 281 (Yossi David ed., 2003) (taking a 
position against interpreting the term Jewish in the Basic Laws as including the Jewish 
religion).  But see Menachem Elon, Constitution by Legislation: The Values of a Jewish and 
Democratic State in Light of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Personal Freedom, 17 IUNEI 
MISHPAT 659, 668–70 (1993) [Hebrew] (taking a position supporting the inclusion of the 
Jewish religion in the term “Jewish”). 
 235 Daphne Barak-Ezez, Law and Religion Under the Status Quo Model: Between Past 
Compromises and Constant Change, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2495 (2009).  For more on the 
“Status Quo” see id. at 2507 n.2 and accompanying text. 
 236 Yonatan Shapira, Secular Politicians and the Status of Religion in the State of Israel, in 
MULTICULTURALISM IN A DEMOCRATIC AND JEWISH STATE, THE ARIEL ROSEN-ZVI MEMORIAL 
BOOK 663, 669 (Menachem Mautner et al. eds., 1998). 
 237 The authority of the various religious communities was established through legislation 
from the period of the British Mandate and was later incorporated into Israeli law.  The 
Palestine Order in Council Sign 51–52 (1922).  The detailed authority of the Jewish 
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the period of Ottoman rule over the Eretz-Israel/ Palestine region, was 
maintained by the British Mandate, and later by the State of Israel. 
The imposition of the religious personal laws of the various 
religious communities on all residents and the lack of an 
alternative civil marriage, constitutes a violation of the right to 
freedom of conscience and belief, as well as a violation of the 
rights of women who are subject to the discriminatory 
patriarchal religious laws of the various religious 
communities.238  
While establishing an exclusively religious system of laws in matters of 
marriage and divorce is probably the most serious entanglement of religion 
within the Israeli state, there are several other areas in which religion, and in 
particular the Orthodox Jewish religion, is given a preferred status by the 
state, either through statutes or through administrative decisions, which 
confer to it state power as well as money.  Thus, the state has established a 
chief rabbinate and has given full control over it to Orthodox Judaism.239  
The Chief Rabbinate is a powerful state organ that enjoys large budgets and 
controls the religious services given by the state to the Jewish population.  
Some of the state and municipal institutions established and financed by the 
state and subject to the religious authority of the Chief Rabbinate are the 
rabbinical courts that deal with matters of marriage and divorce of Jews in 
Israel, the regional religious councils, which deal with the supply of religious 
services—such as burial (public cemeteries in Israel are overwhelmingly 
religious), synagogues, kashrut (Kosher certification of food), etc.—to Jews 
on a regional basis, and the conversion courts, which deal with conversion to 
Judaism.240  
                                                                                                                   
Rabbinical Courts is set out in The Jurisdiction of Rabbinical Courts (Marriage and Divorce), 
Acts 5713-1953, 7LSI 139 (Isr.). 
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 239 Chief Rabbinate of Israel Law, 5740-1980, SH No. 965, p. 90 (Isr.). 
 240 Jewish Religious Services Law, 5731-1971, SH No. 628, p. 130 (Isr.). 
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B.  What Does All This Have to do with the UO?  
Despite the UO community’s anti-Zionist ideology and its enclave 
mentality, the UO community holds key positions in Israel’s religious 
establishment.  UO Rabbis have been serving as judges in the Rabbinical 
Courts system, to which all Jews are subject in matters of marriage and 
divorce, from its inception.241  In fact, UO Rabbis form the majority of 
rabbinical court judges, and at time of writing all but one of the judges on the 
Great Rabbinical Court, which is the highest rabbinical court and hears 
appeals from all the regional rabbinical courts, are UO.242   Through their 
positions, the UO judges are authorized to impose their version of ultra-
orthodox Jewish religious law on all Jews in Israel.  In recent years, with the 
increasing radicalization in the UO community, the rulings of rabbinical 
courts have become more conservative and more detrimental to the rights of 
women and to the rights of converts.  To give just one example, a rabbinical 
court has recently ruled that a wife who sued her husband for damages 
because of his refusal to release her from their marriage for ten years is 
herself to blame for his continuous refusal to divorce her, and that until she 
consents to her husband’s financial demands she is not entitled to the 
divorce.243  
In addition, the influence of UO political parties, which began as early as 
the establishment of the state, has strengthened considerably ever since.244  
This influence has allowed UO politicians to obtain considerable budgets for 
the UO community, which support their Yeshiva studies and their increasing 
families.245  It has also allowed the UO community to have significant impact 
on general issues affecting Israeli society at large, by serving in key positions 
such as the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Housing, the deputy Minister 
of Health, the Minister of Religious Services, the head of the Parliament 
(Knesset) Finance Committee, and the Mayor of Jerusalem.  In their 
capacities in the government, in the Knesset and in the local municipalities, 
                                                                                                                   
 241 Nissan Slomiansky, The Appointment of Rabbinical Court Judges – An Ultra-Orthodox 
State or a Zionist State?, NE’EMANEI TORAH VA’AVODAH, http://www.toravoda.org.il/node/ 
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 243 Rivka Luvitch, Rabbinical courts, raise the anchor!, YNET (Feb. 8, 2011, 2:07 PM), 
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 244 See generally Barak-Erez, supra note 235. 
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UO politicians and public servants strive to force their ultra-Orthodox 
religious ideology on the public at large, in contravention of the liberal 
values of the state.  To give one example, in Jerusalem UO politicians 
controlling the municipal government have for years been denying municipal 
budgets to the Homo-Lesbian community in Jerusalem despite repeated court 
rulings holding that such denial is discriminatory and illegal.246  To give 
another example, the deputy Minister of Health, who is a member of an UO 
political party, has initiated segregation between men and women in official 
events held by the Ministry of Health.  In November 2011, the minister 
instructed that two women, a doctor and a nurse, who received an award 
from the Ministry of Health for their research, may not come up on stage to 
receive their award at the official award ceremony.  The women were 
required to send a male representative to receive the award in their name, 
while they had to observe the ceremony from the balcony of the segregated 
auditorium to which all women were restricted.247  A final example is a 
religious ruling issued in 2010 by fifty municipal Rabbis, both ultra-
Orthodox and religious Zionist, forbidding the sale and rental of homes to 
gentiles, particularly to Arabs.248  All of these examples involve UO public 
servants who receive their salary from the state and claim to be acting within 
their authority.  
The above account demonstrates how UO state officials, representing the 
UO community, are engaged in strengthening the hold of ultra-Orthodox 
religious ideology in the Israeli government and in the Israeli public sphere 
and have significant impact on the lives of all Israelis.  At the same time, 
these officials contend that the UO educational system is entitled to full 
autonomy as part of the freedom of religion and of the multicultural respect 
owed to the UO community as a secluded religious minority which is 
dedicated to its deeply religious (yet deeply illiberal) way of life.  This 
position was adopted by the Knesset in the Unique Cultural Educational 
Institutions Act which exempts UO high school students from studying the 
core curriculum.  However, in light of the considerable state power that the 
UO community wields through its representatives, the allegedly multicultural 
accommodation legislated through the Unique Cultural Educational 
                                                                                                                   
 246 See C.A. 343/09 Open House v. Jerusalem (Sept. 14, PD [2010] (Isr.) (unreported)).  
 247 Ethan Bronner & Isabel Kershner, Israelis Facing a Seismic Rift Over Role of Women, 
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Institutions Act is theoretically unsound and poses a serious threat to the 
liberal democratic infrastructure of the state.  The idiosyncrasy of providing 
this type of multicultural accommodation to the UO in Israel can be best 
understood by comparing their situation to that of two American enclave 
minorities—the Amish and the Satmar Hasidim of Kiryas Joel. 
C.  The UO Community in Israel—Partial Citizens or a Prodigious Enclave 
Community? 
When considering the appropriateness of multicultural accommodations 
for illiberal minorities, Jeff Spinner-Halev introduces a useful distinction 
between full citizens and partial citizens.  He argues that, in general, all 
citizens of the state must adhere to moral requirements of liberal citizenship, 
including citizens belonging to illiberal minority communities.  However, a 
narrow exception to this rule can be made in the case of minority 
communities whose behavior vis-à-vis the state entitles them to be 
considered partial citizens and, consequently, be partially exempt from some 
of the requirements of liberal citizenship.249  According to Spinner-Halev 
many illiberal religious groups want to lead their lives away from the 
mainstream community in order to maintain a distinct identity.  Nevertheless, 
partial citizens are only those isolationist groups whose separation from the 
liberal state and society is almost complete.  Members of such groups must 
not involve themselves in politics, they must not “press the state for financial 
favors of funds to establish institutions for themselves,” and they should not 
“ask for things that will harm other citizens.”250  Spinner-Halev believes that 
allowing partial citizenship under such conditions will not threaten liberal 
citizenship because the conditions for becoming partial citizens are so 
difficult that there is very little likelihood that many groups will choose this 
path.  Thus, partial citizenship rests on a bargain: “as long as the group stays 
away from the common life of the country, and doesn’t try to eat at the 
public trough, then society can agree that citizenship has fewer claims on 
them than on others.”251  
In terms of education, Spinner-Halev maintains that while partial citizens 
cannot be exempt from the duty to teach their children basic skills, they can 
be exempt from teaching them the critical thinking skills that future citizens 
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in a liberal democracy need to acquire.252  A group that, according to 
Spinner-Halev, is entitled to a status of partial citizenship is the Amish in the 
United States.  Consequently, he supports the Yoder decision, which 
exempted the Amish in Wisconsin from the legal duty to send their children 
to school for the last two years of the state’s compulsory education.253  In its 
decision, the Court relied heavily on the nature of the Amish as a law-
abiding, “separate, sharply identifiable and highly self-sufficient community” 
which is self-sustaining to such an extent that it rejects any form of public 
welfare.254  The court further held that the Amish carried the burden of 
demonstrating that the vocational education that they want to offer their 
children in lieu of the compulsory state education is able to provide them 
with basic skills such as “reliability, self-reliance, and dedication to work,” 
and that there are probably few other religious groups or sects who could 
carry such a burden.255 
Conversely, Spinner-Halev argues that isolationist groups that want to 
retain their separation, but at the same time want the state to help them, do 
pose a real threat to society.  An example of such a group, which Spinner-
Halev discusses, is the Satmar Hasidim of Kiryas Joel in New York.  In 
particular, he criticizes the establishment of a publicly-funded school 
exclusively for Satmar children with disabilities.256  He argues that public 
funds should only be used to support public schools that are open to all and 
not public schools that provide separate education to children of insular 
groups.257  Because the Satmars want to use public funds to educate their 
children separately from other children they cannot be considered partial 
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citizens.  In addition, Spinner-Halev argues that the Satmars should not be 
considered partial citizens because many of them use food stamps and live in 
public housing, and because they vote.  In fact, he observes that it is because 
the Satmars vote, and because they usually vote en bloc, following the 
directions of their rabbi, that politicians were willing to cater to their demand 
for a separate school district.258  
Will Kymlicka holds a similar position to Spinner-Halev’s.  According to 
him, as long as isolationist groups are small and sincerely committed to their 
self-imposed isolation they pose no threat to liberal citizenship and to a 
stable liberal order and can therefore be exempted from some obligations of 
citizenship, such as sending their children into common public schools for 
part of their education.259  Nevertheless, Kymlicka emphasizes that such 
groups should not be encouraged, since they are free-riders on a stable liberal 
order which they do not help maintain, but posits that as long as they remain 
small the liberal state can afford to accept them.260   
Despite the fact that the UO are portrayed by supporters of the Unique 
Cultural Institutions Act as partial citizens similar to the Amish, who should 
be entitled to exemptions from the obligations of citizenship, they are, in 
fact, very different from the Amish.  The UO are deeply involved in state and 
municipal politics, and their community is heavily funded by the state.  In 
fact, perhaps ironically, the UO’s extensive involvement in politics and their 
extensive funding by the state are what enabled UO leaders to create and 
maintain the semi-enclave for which they are now claiming multicultural 
protection.  The generous state funding for religious education from early 
childhood through late adulthood has enabled the transformation of the UO 
community into a community of learners in which an unprecedented number 
of adult men study religious studies and do not need to work for a living.  
This enables these men to lead most of their lives without having to step out 
of the UO community.  In addition, state funding of UO men’s religious 
studies has enabled the UO educational system to shun any secular studies, 
since many of its graduates continue their religious studies into adulthood 
and consequently do not have to find jobs.  The shunning of any secular 
education and the exclusive focus on religious studies made possible by 
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increasing state funding has led to the growing radicalization of the UO 
community.261  
Due to its size, the UO community cannot even be compared to the 
Satmar Hasidim of New York, despite the fact that both communities subsist 
mainly on public funds, which they obtain using their political power.  The 
UO are by no means a small minority whose freeriding can be easily 
absorbed by the larger Israeli society.  Almost one out of every three Jewish 
students in the Israeli primary school system is educated in an UO school, 
and the number is continuously increasing owing to the UO community’s 
high fertility rates.262  This means that the number of school children who are 
not taught basic skills and civic education and are given an exclusively 
religious education is very high, creating serious concerns as to Israel’s 
continued economic sustainability and democratic stability.   
Furthermore, because of the unique religion-state relations in Israel the 
power that the UO community holds over other citizens and its ability to 
undermine the liberal democratic structure of the state are considerable.  The 
establishment of the Orthodox Jewish religion in the state has enabled the 
UO community, through its representatives in the religious establishment, to 
become the official interpreters of the Jewish religion, determining the legal 
status of other citizens’ marriages and divorces, of their conversions, and of 
their children’s religious status on the basis of their own radical religious 
ideology.263  In addition, the lack of separation between religion and the state 
coupled with the UO’s extensive political power enables them to deepen the 
hold of their radical interpretation of the Jewish religion over the Israeli 
public sphere.  Consequently, one could argue that far from being a 
disempowered community, the UO is a prodigious enclave community that 
uses its political and state power both to guarantee its own flourishing and 
expansion, and to enforce its ideology on the rest of society.  Thus, unlike the 
Amish or even the Satmars, the UO do not isolate their members from 
mainstream society merely as a means of maintaining their separate way of 
life, but also as a means of fostering a radical religious ideology which they 
can then impose on others.  
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This last point relates to a final important distinction between the UO and 
other isolationist groups.  Most isolationist groups do not challenge the 
liberal democratic structure of the country within which they reside.  Even 
the Satmars in New York, who are UO Jews themselves, whose way of life is 
quite similar to that of the UO in Israel, who use their voting power to their 
advantage, and who avail themselves of government funds, have no intention 
of challenging the liberal structure of the United States.  They are, in fact, 
supportive of it, since it guarantees their religious freedom and their rights as 
a minority culture.264  Furthermore, the Satmars’ small size, as well as the 
separation of church and state that exists in the United States, precludes their 
ability to enforce their illiberal religious ideology on others.  Conversely, the 
UO community in Israel has, from early on, challenged the liberal 
democratic structure of the state and has been given state power and political 
influence that have enabled it to gradually erode this structure and implement 
its own illiberal religious ideology.  Under these circumstances it is wrong to 
view the UO community as a disempowered minority that is entitled to a 
multicultural accommodation of its illiberal practices.265   
V.  CONCLUSION 
Almost one out of every three Jewish children in the Israeli primary 
school system is educated in the UO educational system, which is heavily 
funded by the state but does not teach boys almost any secular subjects.  This 
state of affairs poses a serious threat to the continued sustainability and 
stability of Israeli democracy.  Those who support the continuation of this 
status quo claim that it is required by the right of UO parents and the UO 
community to freedom of religion and to multicultural accommodation.  The 
survey of theorists and countries presented in Part III refutes this claim.  
Furthermore, supporters of the continued exemption of UO education from 
the core curriculum regard the UO community as an enclave community and 
fail to take into consideration both its extensive political power and its hold 
over Israel’s religious establishment, which, due to Israel’s state-religion 
relations, yields considerable power over the lives of all Israelis.  Thus, they 
fail to take into account the violation of rights that women, Arabs, 
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homosexuals, converts, and others suffer as a consequence of the application 
of deeply illiberal Ultra-Orthodox religious ideology by OU politicians and 
state officials—who are the products of an UO education system that shuns 
any civic education. 
The aforementioned suggests that it is imperative to introduce the core 
curriculum into the UO educational system.  However, since the UO 
educational system is known for its lack of cooperation with the state and for 
being almost impenetrable to outside supervision, direct enforcement of the 
core curriculum may prove impracticable.266  It would seem that a more 
suitable way to go about creating the necessary change in the UO educational 
system is by cutting funding to any UO school that does not teach the core 
curriculum, including citizenship education.  Cutting funding is both less 
intrusive than direct and universal enforcement, and, as the experience in the 
countries discussed in this article shows, cutting funding is an efficient 
means of ensuring that schools conform to state requirements.  Supervision 
over the teaching of the different subjects by schools that choose to receive 
funding can be done by testing students’ knowledge in each subject, a 
method which is both less intrusive and more accurate than direct 
supervision of instruction.  
However, in this Article I have tried to show that the characteristics of the 
UO educational system cannot be understood or assessed without 
understanding the structure of the UO community and its position in the 
Israeli polity.  It would have been impossible for the UO educational system 
to shun all forms of secular education if the UO community were not able to 
offer most of its young male adults the option of continuing their religious 
studies for an unlimited time with government funding.  Consequently, an 
essential step in order to encourage the UO educational system for boys to 
teach secular studies is to gradually cut the funding for most of the adult men 
who study in UO religious institutions of higher education—Yeshivot Gdolot 
and Kolelim—and retain funding only for a select few on the basis of 
excellence.  As the experience of other countries shows, the realization that 
most of their graduates will have to find jobs in the modern world, coupled 
with the need for state funding, would encourage UO schools to introduce 
adequate secular studies that would be supervised by the state.  It is 
important to note that, despite the central importance of Talmud Tora as a 
religious precept, it has in the past always been the case in UO communities, 
both in Israel and abroad, that only those who excel in Yeshiva studies 
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become professional learners, while all others go out to work and earn a 
living that supports them as well as their communities.267  The transformation 
of the UO community in Israel into a community in which most men are 
learners and do not work for a living is a modern phenomenon facilitated by 
the UO community’s political power, which has enabled it to obtain ever-
increasing budgets for its religious institutions.268  
Finally, a third step that must be taken in order to facilitate the 
introduction of secular studies in UO schools is to gradually require 
candidates for public service positions in Israel’s religious establishment to 
meet minimal requirements for secular studies, including citizenship 
education.  The fact that most, if not all, UO representatives in Israel’s 
religious establishment lack secular education, and especially citizenship 
education, including education for tolerance and equality, has serious 
implications for the rights of all Israelis.  It is hardly surprising that UO 
public servants apply their radically illiberal religious ideology to the citizens 
they are expected to serve, when this ideology is the only one they have ever 
been exposed to.  If UO public servants were exposed from an early age to 
secular education and to citizenship education, they might be more open to 
accepting the diversity which characterizes modern Israeli society and to 
endorsing the state’s legal commitment to equality and pluralism, as their 
position in the public service requires them to do.  Although studying the 
core curriculum may not be sufficient to instill in UO public servants, and 
indeed in any public servant, the necessary commitment to equality and 
pluralism that must characterize the public service in a liberal state, it is 
certainly a prerequisite.  
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